J C MAHESHWARI Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner is a practicing Advocate at Aligarh. In the year 1982, he was appointed as Notary Public by the U. P. Government. In, February 1987. he was also appointed as Special Counsel, Urban Land Ceiling at Aligarh by the State Government. On 24th October, 1989, the State Government through the District Judge, Aligarh, required the petitioner to give option as to which of the two posts namely Notary Public and Special Counsel, Urban Land Ceiling he wanted to retain (Annexure 1 to the writ petition). This latter was received by the petitioner on 9-11-1989.

(2.) BEFORE the petitioner could send reply to the aforesaid communication, the State Government by another letter dated 7th November, 1989 terminated the services of the petitioner as Special Counsel Urban Land Ceiling A copy of the said order is Annexure 2 to the writ petition. This latter was, however, not received by the petitioner as it was addressed to the District Judge, Aligarh and no copy thereof was sent to him. Subsequently, when the District Magistrate, Aligarh invited applications for fresh appointments, the petitioner came to know of this letter. The contention of the petitioner is that the work and conduct of the petitioner was throughout very satisfactory and there were no complaints against him. He had given very good results. There was absolutely no bar in holding the posts of Notary Public and Special Counsel. Urban Land Ceiling together. Instances were given where these two posts were held together by other persons in other districts. His grievance is that the impugned order dated 7-11-89 was passed with undue haste without waiting for the reply of the petitioner He moved several representations to the: State Government but no reply thereof was received by the petitioner. Surprisingly, he received another letter dated 23-12-1989 in which the District judge, Aligarh was asked by the State Government that the option asked for in earlier letter dated 24th October, 1989 from the petitioner had not been received (Annexure 5 to. the writ petition). It was. therefore, contended by the petitioner that the impugned order dated 7th November, 1989 was passed without application of mind. He was not afforded any opportunity of hearing It was arbitrary and against the principles of equality. In its counter affidavit, the State Government has averred that the petitioner was appointed as Special Counsel, Urban Land Ceiling in 1987 and he was asked to submit details in Form No. 2 L. R. Manual. He never complied with it, In the appointment letter, the petitioner was asked to resign from other posts including that of Notary Public The petitioner made several representations to the Government to allow him to continue on both the posts. After considering the matter, the State Government terminated the services of the petitioner as Special Counsel. Urban Land Ceiling. There was no haste as alleged; The petitioner had no claim on the said post. No documents were annexed with the counter affidavit. The petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit has denied all these averments.

(3.) IN order to consider the question as to whether the impugned order dated 7th November, 1989, terminating the engagement of the petitioner as Special Counsel, Urban Land Ceiling is arbitrary, it is necessary to look into the order itself A copy of the order is Annexure 2 to the writ petition. It shows that the State Government hats terminated the appointment of the petitioner by one stroke of pen arbitrarily without assigning any reason and also without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner IN the case of Kumari Shrilekha (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has held that the appointment of a District Government Counsel cannot be terminated without assigning any cause though it is not necessary that the reason for which the termination is made should also be communicated to the petitioner. It means that the appointment of a District Government Counsel cannot be terminated at the sweet-will of the State Government. There must be valid reasons for that. The termination cannot be wholly arbitrary.