RESERVE BANK OF INDIA Vs. S P SRIVASTAVA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a defendant's application in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, directed against a decree passed by the Courts below for the ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent and damages. Shortly stated, the plaint case was that the plaintiff was the owner and landlord of premises No. 111/272. Harsh Nagar, Kanpur of which the defend ant (Applicant herein) was the tenant in so far as the front ground floor portion of the said house was concerned on a monthly rental of Rs. 350/- U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable to the premises in question as the same were a 'public building' within the meaning of Section (2) (1) (a) of the aforesaid Act. The tenancy of the defendant has been terminated by the means of a notice which was duly served on the defendant. Despite that notice the defendant has not vacated the premises and hence the suit. The defense was that the said Act was not applicable to the building in question. The suit was barred by Section 21 (8) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 as well as U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1972. On the pleading of the parties various issues were framed. One of the issues was whether the premises in question were outside the purview of the BT. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, Another issue framed was whether the jurisdiction of the Court was barred by Section 15 of the U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1972. Both the aforesaid issues have been answered against the defendant. The suit has been decreed for the relief's claimed by the plaintiff-opposite party on the finding that a valid notice determining the tenancy of the defendant and the defendant having failed to vacate the premises, the applicant was liable to be evicted. Two contentions have been raised by the learned counsel for the appli cant in support of this revision. The first contention was that it is only by virtue of the amendment introduced by the U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 that the premises in question fell within the definition of 'public building'. The said Amending Act was not retrospective. This lease in question was executed in favor of the defendant prior to the coming into forc2 of this Amending Act, 1976. The contention was that even though the suit was filed after coming into force of the said Amending Act, the lease in question could not be covered by the definition of 'public building' as defined under the various provisions of the said Act. It was urged that the Amending Act was not retrospective in its operation and it concerned it self only with the leases which were executed subsequent to coming into force of the aforesaid Act. I cannot agree. There is no element of retrospectively in the application of the Act to the premises in question which undeniably was a public building within the meaning of Act 13 of 1972 at the institution of the suit. The premi ses in question were hence clearly outside the purview of the said Act. As regards the submission that the Act applied only to leases which were executed subsequent to coining into force of the U. P. Amending Act 28 of 1976, the same stands concluded by a decision of this Court reported in 1980 Allahabad Law Journal (Notes of Cases 8) in the case of State Bank of India, Faizabad v. Hari Narain and another ). A learned Single Judge of this Court has occasion to consider an identical controversy and on an analysis of the applicable provisions the learned Judge held that under Section 3 (o) all leases were covered, whether executed before or after the Act. I am in respectful agreement with the decision of that case. In my opinion the mere fact that the lease in question was executed prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act, 1976, will not take the premises in question outside the definition of a 'public building' under Section 2 (1) (a) read with Section 3 (o ). Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Khubi Singh Yadav and others v. District Judge, Allahabad and others. (1980 A. L. J, 235) In that case the question which fell for determination was whether Section 12 (3-A) (inserted by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976) was retrospective in its operation. The Full Bench held that the said provision was not retrospective in its operation and that it would apply only where the offensive event, namely the transfer has taken place after the coming into force of Section 12 (3-A ). In my opinion the aforesaid Full Bench decision has absolutely no appli cation to the controversy at hand. The Full Bench was concerned with an altogether different provision appearing in a different context. In the present case the controversy is whether the mere fact that the lease in question was executed before the coming into force of the Amending Act, 1976 would take the building out of the purview of the definition of 'public building' as amended by the said Act of 1976. I see no warrant for making a distinction between public buildings where the leases may have been granted prior to the coming into force of the said Amending Act and those in which leases were granted after that Act. No such distinction is discernible having regard to the context of the relevant statutory provisions under Section 2 (1) (a) and 3 (o ). The second submission of the learned counsel was that the building in question was in any case public premises to which U. P. Public Premises (Evic tion of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1972 was applicable. That being so, it was urged that Section 15 barred the suit. The submission is without any merit. The said Act is applicable only to public premises which are in occupation of unauthorized occupants. In my view, the defendant cannot claim to have been unauthorized occupant within the meaning of Section 2 (g) of the said Act. The defendant in the present ease was in lawful occupation of the premises in question under a valid lease granted to him by the landlord. The mere fact that the defendant's lease may have been determined prior to the institution of the suit does not per se bring the defendant within the mischief of the definition of unauthorized occupant under Section 2 (g ). The Court below was, therefore, right in negative the contention of the petitioner. Further, plaintiff has no remedy under that Act. The suit hence cannot be held to be barred by the Act. Moreover, the Court below is right in taking the view that the Act has no application where the Government or Public Sector Corporation itself is being sought to be evicted. No other point was urged in support of this revision. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed with costs. The execution of the decree for ejectment of the applicant is however, stayed for a period of six months from today, and provided the applicant shall hand over vacant possession of the disputed accommodation to the plaintiff-opposite party within this period. The applicant shall also deposit the entire arrears of rent and damages due up to date together with damages for the next six months in the trial Court within a period of two months from today. If the applicant has already made any deposits in the Court below the same shall be taken into consideration. In the event of the applicant failing to make the deposit, as directed herein, the decree for the ejectment shall be liable to be exe cuted forthwith. .