IRSHAD ALI Vs. TENTH ADDL DISTRICT JUDGE KANPUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution arises out of a suit for eviction of the tenant, filed by the landlady. In brief, the Facts are these:- The landlady, respondent No. 2, filed the suit on 3-2-1973 claiming the relief of eviction and other connected reliefs by way of arrears of rent, damages for use and occupation etc. The suit was contested by the tenant and during the pendency of the suit an application was moved under Section 39 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The benefit of the said provision was claimed by the tenant. The application was allowed by the trial Court but in a revision the lower revisional Court set aside the order of the trial Court and it was held that the tenant was not entitled to the benefit of Section 39 inasmuch as the deposit was made beyond the time limit as the building was deemed to be constructed on 14-11-1966 when the fact of its completion was reported to the "nagar Mahapalika by the communication of the said date which was marked as Annexure 7 in the trial Court. The trial Court erred in law in holding that the date of reporting was not relevant and only the date of first assessment was relevant under the Explanation 1 to Section 2 (2) of the Act. While it is true that the date of occupation will not be relevant in case the other two criteria laid down in the said Explanation are available, there can be little doubt that as between the date of reporting of completion to the Nagar Mahapalika and the date of first assessment the earlier of the two dates will prevail. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that reporting must be by an official of the Nagar Mahapalika and a private reporting is not 'contem plated in clause (a) of Explanation I. In my view, this contention is not correct. There is nothing in the provision to suggest that the reporting should be only by an official of the local authority. There can be little doubt that the house owner is in the best position to report about the completion of a building. It is not necessary to enter into the controversy as to whether such a reporting may some time be taken recourse to by way of fraudulent proceedings also. In the facts of the instant case, at least such has not been the allegation and there has been no doubting of the genuineness of Ext. 7 in the facts of the instant case. The learned counsel also sought to contend that even though the formal proof of the docu ment had been dispensed with, still, its contents required to be proved. In my view, this contention will not be examined within the narrow ambit of the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. I cannot act as an appellate Court in the instant jurisdiction. I would not like to say anything about the merit of this contention. However, it may be pointed out that the document was exhibited and formed part of the record. This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed inlimine. .