(1.) THE petitioner has challenged his detention under an order dated 9 -7 -1982 passed by the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad, under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980. The petitioner was arrested on 11 -7 -1982 and on the same day the grounds of detention and the order of detention were also served on him. The order of detention recites that the District Magistrate was satisfied that the petitioner was likely to indulge in activities which would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and in order to prevent him from indulging in such activities it was considered necessary to detain him. The grounds of detention furnished to the detenu refer to four instances dated 27 -1 -1981. 13 -6 -1981, 3 -10 -1981, and 36 -3 -1982. The petitioner preferred a representation to the State Government on 20 -7 -1982, which was rejected on 2 -8 -1982.
(2.) THE solitary point canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the grounds of detention and, particularly, ground No. 1 was vague and irrelevant, and could not form the basis of valid detention order and further that the petitioner was materially prejudiced thereby and prevented from making an effective representation. The learned counsel focussed our attention on ground No. 1 of the detention, which was to the effect that on 27 -1 -1981 the sub -Divisional Magistrate, Ghaziabad, passed an order that from the report dated 1 -10 -1980; submitted by the Tahsildar, Ghaziabad; the fact had, emerged that some land belonging to the Gram Sabha Pasonda of Tahsil Gahziabad had been fraudently put in possession of some persons by the petitioner and his associates. The area of the land was mentioned, but the names of the persons alleged to have been inducted on the aforesaid land were not disclosed.
(3.) WE find sufficient force in the other submission also made on behalf of the petitioner, namely, that the above mentioned ground was irrelevant and could not be construed as a fact amounting to breach of or threat to public order. It is on the face of it an individual crime, which can be dealt with precisely as a challenge to law and order, and there is nothing either in the nature or gravity of the act 'per se' which may impart to it the character of an invasion of public order. It is not touched with the faintest sprinkle of public disorder. A person may commit an isolated act of cheating or forgery or land grabbing with regard to a property, but that will be an individual act and has to be dealt with merely as a matter relating to law and order 'simpliciter'. If similar acts are repeated by the same person and his associates with frequency, some vestiges of jeopardy to public order may be discerned; but in instant case we find that the incidents, covered by the other grounds of detention served on the petitioner, are of an entirely different category, being cases of violence and assault. Thus, even in conjunction with the other grounds of detention, ground No. 1 could not be regarded as relevant for detention in connection with the maintenance of public order. The factual allegations recited in this ground pose a typically law and order problem and do not come within the contours of of public order.