SUGNAMAL Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Petitioner has directed this petition against the order dated 5 -1 -1979 passed by the Public Authority City Magistrate constituted under U.P. Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959 (U.P. Act No. XIII of 1959), hereinafter called Eviction Act, as amended by U.P. Public Land and Premises Laws (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1970 by which the Petitioner's application for impleadment of Custodian for the State in proceedings pending before the authority has been rejected. The Petitioner had claimed impleadment of the Custodian on the basis of Sec. 50 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (U.P. Act No. 31 of 1950), hereinafter called the Administration Act. The material question that arises for determination is whether the Public Authority is a Civil or Revenue Court within the meaning of Sec. 50 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. The petition has arisen in the circumstances hereinafter indicated.

(2.) On 31 -12 -1970 the State of U.P. in the Department of Nazool through the Deputy Commissioner, Faizabad, made an application before the Public Authority, Faizabad, claiming Petitioner's eviction from plot No. 921M. (Area 6 -10 -0 K) Chak No. 13 Mohalla Khirki Ali Beg, Post Office, Faizabad, Annexure No. 5. The application was made under Sec. 3/4 of the U.P. Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959. The claim of the State was that it was the owner of the land in question and the Petitioner had no right or title whatsoever therein but he illegally occupied the same in the year 1957 and illegally enclosed the land by boundary walls. It was claimed that the land in question was a public land within the meaning of the Eviction Act. In the relief clause it was claimed that the Petitioner be evicted from the land and damages may be awarded against the Petitioner for wrongful occupation of the land. On receipt of notice of this application the Petitioner preferred an objection by filing written statement, Annexure No. 6. In this written statement the Petitioner pointed out that the land in dispute originally belonged to one Sri. Mohammad Yaqub who migrated to Pakistan whereupon the land in dispute was treated as Evacuee Property and was declared as much after full enquiry and the same vested in the Custodian for the State. It was further asserted that the land in dispute was auctioned on behalf of the Custodian Department and the Petitioner's bid was accepted and the sale was knocked down in his favour and he was delivered possession of the land. On this basis the Petitioner claimed title in the land in dispute. During the pendency of the proceedings the Petitioner made application before the Public Authority for impleadment of the Custodian. From the order passed by the Public Authority it appears that Sec. 50 of the Administration Act was relied upon by the Petitioner .for claiming impleadment of the Custodian. The application was opposed on behalf of the State and it was rejected by the Public Authority by its order dated 15 -1 -1979 Annexure -9. Aggrieved by this order the Petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(3.) It appears that before the public authority the application was opposed on behalf of the State on the ground that the present proceedings were under the special enactment and, therefore, Sec. 50 of the Administration Act was not applicable. The Public Authority has merely noticed the arguments of the learned District Government Counsel who opposed the application without recording any finding as to whether Sec. 50 was applicable or not. Before me Sri. K.M.N. Chak, learned Counsel for the State, argued that Sec. 50 has no application to the present proceedings inasmuch as the Public Authority was neither a Civil Court nor a Revenue Court. The learned Counsel argued that in fact the Public Authority was not at all a Court but was merely a Tribunal and, therefore, Sec. 50 was not attracted. Sri. H.S. Sahai, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, on the other hand, argued that the Public Authority while dealing with the application for eviction exercised same powers as were exercised by a Civil or Revenue Court and, therefore, the Public Authority was a Court within the meaning of Sec. 50. He also argued that since the matter engaging the attention of the Public Authority was of the civil nature, the said authority was acting as Civil Court.