RAM DAYAL Vs. GANGA PRASAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is defendant's second appeal in a suit for recovery of Rs. 1500/- on the foot of a promissory note. The genuineness of the promissory note was disputed and it was denied that any loan was advanc ed. Both the Courts below have found the promissory note to be genuine and have held that the loan was in fact advanced. The suit was decreed by the trial Court for recovery of Rs. 1500/- with costs and pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 3 percent per annum. That decree was confirmed by the lower appellate Court. The findings that the promissory note was genuine and that the loan was in fact advanced are based on an appraisal of the evidence on the record. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant, I find it impossible to say that the findings suffer from any error of law. Learned counsel for the appellant however, moved an application and contended that the suit was barred by Section 26 (4) of the U. P. Regulation of Money Lending Act, 1976 in as much as the loan in question was not disclosed in the statement filed by the plaintiff before the Registrar of Money Lending and this second appeal must, therefore, be allowed and the decreed passed in the suit be discharged. The U. P Regulation of Money Lending Act. 1976 came into force during the pendency of the second appeal in this Court. The date of the promissory note was 15th July, 1963 The suit was decreed by the trial Court on 17th September 1968 and the decree was confirmed by the lower appellate Court on 8th July, 1970. Obviously the loan was advanced and the decree was passed long before the said Act came Into force. Section 18 of the Act as It now stands after its amendment by U. P. Act No. J of 1976 only bars the institution of a suit, obviously after the enforcement of the Act on the basis of any loan, agreement or security referred to in sub-section (I) of Section 15 which all refer to loans advance or agreement or security given or taken after the commencement of the Act, unless at the time of advancing of such loan or making such agreement or taking such security the money lender held a valid certificate of registration and the same had not been refused or the period with in which the application could be made under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 7 had not expired. Obviously none of the provisions of Section 18 are applicable to the present case. Section 26 is the first section of Chapter VII which contains the miscellaneous provisions of the Act. It lays down by sub-section (1) that every money lender carrying on the business of money Tending from before the commencement of the Act shall submit to the Regis trar, a statement in the prescribed form within a period of three moths from the date of the commencement of the Act provided that the Registrar may on sufficient cause condone the delay and accept the statement submitted with in three months from the date of the commencement of U. P. Regulation of Money Lending (Amendment) Act, 1978 sub-section (2) shows that the statement referred to in sub-section (1) shall contain the particulars of debts due to each money lender and of deposits made with him and such other parti culars as may be prescribed. Sub-section (3) shows that every such state ment shall be counter-signed dated and sealed by the Registrar and shall be kept and maintained in the manner prescribed. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on sub-section (4) which reads as follows: "notwithstanding anything contained in any law contract, decree or order or any other law for the time being In force, no money lender shall be entitled to claim any amount from a debtor in respect of any loan advanced before the commencement of this Act, unless the name of such debtor and the amount due from him has been specified in the statement referred to in sub-section (1 ). " According to learned counsel this prohibits the enforcement of any loan advanced before the commencement of the Act, by passing of a decree in a pending suit whether in the original Court or in a Court of appeal or revision or even by way of execution after the passing of a decree. On the other hand it may be said that the claim for the amount in ques tion in the present suit which was in respect of a loan advanced before the commencement of the Act had already been made long before the commence ment of the Act. The claim had even been decreed and nothing under sub section (4) prohibits the enforcement or the execution of that decree nor does it in any manner control the further progress of the appeal from that decree which is pending in this Court. The appeal has to be heard and decided in accordance with the law contained in the Code of Civil Procedure on the merits of the case. The provisions of sub-section (4) does not affect the maintainability, the progress or the hearing or the decision of the appeal in any manner. It cannot be disputed that a statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation and no further retrospective effect should be given to the provisions of a statute than is expressly provided therein. In as much as the Act does not make any provisions in respect of the further continuation or the main tainability or progress of the appeal, I find it difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, that the suit giving rise to this second appeal should be held to be barred by sub-section (4) of Section 26 on the ground that this appeal is a continuation of the suit and that, therefore, the appeal should be allowed and the suit dismissed. In the result, the application made on 5th January, 1982 is dismissed. The appeal has no force and is dismissed with costs. .