SRI RAM Vs. GIRDHARI LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) KHATA No. 109 in dispute which consists of about 23 plots in all was recorded in the basic year khatauni in the name of Girdhari Lal, the original respondent no. 1 alone. The petitioner Sriram preferred a claim before the consolidation authorities contending that he had one-half share therein. Girdhari Lal and Sriram were descendants of a common ancestor. The Consolidation Officer allowed the petitioner's claim in respect of three plots only. On appeal preferred by the opposite party the Settlement Officer dismissed the claim of the petitioner and held that the entire land belonged to the opposite party. The petitioner filed a revision, and on that revision the Dy. Director upheld the petitioner's claim in respect of one half share over the entire holding and not merely in respect of three plots as had been held by the Consolidation Officer. Aggrieved by this decision of the Dy. Director the opposite party filed a Writ Petition No. 22 of 1975 in this court contending that the opposite party was the sole tenure holder of the land to the exclusion of the petitioner, that the judgment of the Settlement Officer was correct, and that the Dy. Director had wrongly interfered with that order. During the pendency of this writ petition a compromise petition was filed in this Court signed by both the parties and their counsel. A copy of that compromise petition dated 16-8-66 is Annexure C-1 to the counter-affidavit. This compromise petition consists of five paragraphs. The first paragraph recites the subject matter of the dispute ; the second paragraph recites the findings of the Dy. Director. The third paragraph runs as follows :-

(2.) THE terms of this order seem to have emboldened the petitioner subsequently to repudiate the aforesaid compromise. THEreupon, the opposite party filed a suit under Section 229-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act in the Revenue Court about two years later. THE plaint of this suit has not been placed on the record but a copy of the same has been shown to me during the course of hearing by the learned counsel for the petitioner with the consent of the learned counsel for the opposite parties. THE plaint recites the course of the earlier litigation, and the opposite party ultimately rests his claim on the order of the Settlement Officer which was in his favour and in the alternative on the aforesaid compromise. Thus it was prayed that the opposite party be declared to be the sole , tenure-holder of the said khata or in the alternative to be co-sharer to the extent of three-fourths the share therein. THE suit was contested by the petitioner. It was contended that this court itself had not recorded or given effect to the compromise and the consolidation authorities had also not been approached to do so. As such, according to the petitioner, the suit in the revenue court was barred by section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as the revenue court could not go behind the decision of the Dy. Director which had become final in view of the dismissal of the earlier writ petition filed by the opposite party against it.

(3.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has contended that as the compromise had not been given effect to by this court in the earlier writ petition it was not open to the Revenue Court to have given effect to the same. It has also been argued that the so called compromise petition-Annexure C-1 was described in the title as an application under Or. 23 R. 1 CPC. Thus, the opposite party merely wanted to withdraw the writ petition and accordingly this court had dismissed the writ petition. So far as this argument is concerned it has no substance. A mere misdescription of the legal provision under which an application is made is of no consequence. The court has to look at the substance of the application and the prayer contained therein. There was no prayer in the application for withdrawal of the writ petition. Thus the reference to R. 1 of Or. 23 was clearly a misnomer and cannot be taken advantage of. The wordings of the prayer clearly indicated that the application was meant to be under Or. 23 R, 3 CPC or the principle underlying it to the extent the same may be applicable to a writ petition.