SHIAM LAL Vs. ASHOK KUMAR AND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is complainant's revision and it is directed against an order of acquittal passed in favour of the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 who were standing trial on a police Chalani report under Sections 392|397, I. P. C. The case was committed to the Sessions by the Magistrate on April 16, 1980. The learned Additional Sessions Judge framed charge under Sections 392| 397, I. P. C. against the accused respondent Gyan Chand and charge under Section 392, I. P. C. simpliciter against accused respondents Ram Deo. Ashok Kumar and Sniva Kumar on May 16, 1980. The case was fixed on July 26, 1980 for evidence. On that date the Order Sheet reveals that prosecution examined three witnesses, namely, Shyam Lal (P. W. 1), Hardwari Lal (P. W. 2) and Ishwardin (P. W. 3 ). Thereafter, curiously enough, the State moved an application to discharge other witnesses including the investigation officer. That application was not opposed from the side of the accused. Thereafter, statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313, Cr. P. C. on that vey date. The accused were asked to enter upon defence on that very date. The-accused stated that they had no evidence to adduce and this was stated on that very date. Thereafter, arguments were heard on that very date and curiously enough on that very date, namely, July 26, 1980, the following operative order was passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kheri:- " Sarvasri Ashok Kumar, Sheo Kumar, Gyan Chand and Ram Deo are hereby found not guilty of the charges levelled against them and are hereby acquitted on all counts. They are on bail. They need not surrender. Their bail bonds are cancelled and sureties stand discharged. " Then all of a sudden on July 28, 1980 a full-fledged judgment is said to have been delivered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in which the operative order of July 7, 1980 was incorporated. It was argued before me by the learned counsel for the revisionist that the judgment pronounced on July 26, 1980 is no judgment in the eye of law, inasmuch as, it is not in consonance with Sections 353 and 354 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was also urged that the judgment dated July 28, 1980 would not become part of the judgment delivered on July 26, 1980. According to the learned counsel actually there were two judgments in this case. Section 353, Cr. P. C. prescribes in what manner the judgment can be pronounced. Clause (a) sub-section (1) of Section 353, Cr. P. C. says that the judgment has to be pronounced in open court by the Presiding Officer by delivering the whole of the judgment. Section 354, Cr. P. C. prescribes the mode of judgment and it says that the judgment should contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. I am omitting the other clause of Section 354, Cr. P. C because it is obvious that a Sessions Judge is expected to write a judgment which must contain not only the facts of the case, but also the point or points for determination, the decision and the reasons for giving a decision which can be either acquittal or conviction. It is not open to a Sessions Judge to short-circuit the trial of a sessions case by pronouncing a judgment which the present Sessions Judge did on July 26, 1980. Indeed, this judgment is no judgment in the eyes of law. I must remark that this is probably the first case in my experience that judgment in a Sessions Trial v/as pronounced in this manner. I fail to understand what was the hurry which prompted the Additional Sessions Judge to pronounce such a ridiculous operative order on July 26, 1980 and thereafter immediately after two days to give a judgment which could be termed as a judgment in consonance with Sections 353 and 354. Cr. P. C. It is high time that the present. Additional Sessions Judge learnt the manner in which the judgments in sessions trials have to be pronounced. He is supposed to be familiar with Sections 353 and 354, Cr. P. C. There is a ruling of this Court on this very point reported in Pitam v. State (Cr. Rev. No. 1157 of 1979; April 4, 1980, A. C. C. (1980) 70.) wherein Mahavir Singh, J. observed that:- " The judgment which should have included reasons therein was neither ready on that date nor it had been dictated in open court. All that was delivered was the operative portion. That alone was signed, dated and pronounced. The judgment dated June 18, 1979 cannot be a part of the judgment of June 13, 1979 because under Section 396, Cr. P. C. no court can alter the judgment after delivery of the same except in a case of clerical or arithmetical error. So that judgment cannot be regarded a part of the judgment of June 13, 1979. " I am in respectful agreement with the observations noted above. As a result, I would allow the revision quash both the judgments dated July 26, 1980 and July 28, 1980 and direct that this sessions trial shall be decided in accordance with law by a Sessions Judge, other than the Sessions Judge who decided this case. It should be open to the prosecution to give further evidence in this case. It should be the endeavour of the Sessions Judge concerned to dispose of this Sessions Trial within two months from the date of the receipt of the record. .