MANGEY RAM Vs. FIRST ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE MEERUT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition arised out of the proceedings which were initiated by the filing of a suit by the landlord for the eviction of the tenant.

(2.) THE facts, in brief, are these. A suit was filed by the respondent No. 3 as the landlord for the eviction of the petitioner who was the tenant. Arrears of rent and damages were also claimed. THE suit for eviction was dismissed but so far as the relief for rent was concerned, it was observed in the judgment that as the money had been deposited in the Court by the defendant therefore, no relief was needed to be given to the plaintiff landlord. However, a direction was given that the money so deposited in the Court, could be withdrawn by the plaintiff. THEreafter, a revision was filed and the same was allowed by the lower Revisional Court by its judgment dated 19-5-1975. THEreafter, a second revision was filed in this Court and during the pendency of the said revision in this Court an application under S. 40 read with S. 39 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 was given by the petitioner. By an order dated 8th Oct. 1975 the Court permitted the petitioner to make the deposit subject to objections, if any, filed by the landlord. In the judgment of this Court dated 15th Sept. 1978, it has been observed that no objection was filed by the landlord, and, therefore, the said application under S. 40 read with S. 39 of the Act was allowed. Subsequently, this Court by its judgment dated 15th Sept. 1978 allowed the revision and sent back the case to the lower Revisional Court for deciding whether the deposits and other conditions laid down in Ss. 39 (sic ). After determining the said controversy, the lower Revisional Court was directed to decide whether the landlord was entitled to a decree for eviction or not.

(3.) SRI Misra contended that the view of the lower Revisional Court, that there was a shortfall in the deposit, is not correct. He contended that once the application under S. 40 read with S. 39 of the Act had been made in this Court in the aforementioned revision and no objection had been filed by the landlord to the same, it is not open to the landlord to contend now that the said application under S. 40 read with S. 39 of the Act was not maintainable. He further contended that the landlord submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court in the aforesaid revision and he cannot now call in question the orders passed in the said revision. The learned Counsel for the petitioner in this connection placed reliance on the well known decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Pannalal Vinjraj v. Union of India (AIR 1957 SC 397), which was a case under the Indian Income-tax Act 1922. In para 45 the Supreme Court laid down as follows:- "there is moreover another feature which is common to both these groups and it is that none of the petitioners raised any objection to their cases being transferred in the manner stated above and in fact submitted to the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officers to whom their cases had been transferred. It was only after our decision in Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India (AIR 1956 SC 479) (supra) was pronounced on 20th March, 1965, that these petitioners woke up and asserted their alleged rights, the Amritsar group on 20th April, 1956, and the Raichur group on 5th Nov. 1956. If they acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officers to whom their cases were transferred, they were certainly not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32. It is well settled that such conduct of the petitioners would disentitle them to any relief at the hands of this Court (Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. II, 3rd Edn. , p. 140, para 165, Rex v. Tabrum, Ex Parte Desh, (1907) 97, LT 551, O. A. O. K. Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Corporation of Madras, (1927) ILR 50 Mad 130 : (AIR 1927 Mad 130 ). ")