GIRIWAR PRASAD TRIPATHI Vs. DISTRICT ASSISTANT REGISTRAR, CO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Writ Petition No. 3087 of 1981 and the connected W.P. Nos. 3920, 4147, 4327 and 4775 of 1981 contain common questions of law and fact and consequently we proposed to dispose them of by a common judgment.

(2.) The petitioners in all these cases were working as Secretary of various Co-operative Societies and were members of the Centralised Services governed by the Uttar Pradesh Primary Agricultural Co-operative Credit 'Societies (Centralised Service) Rules, 1976. While they were working against these posts, suspension orders were issued under the signatures of the Secretary of the District Administrative Committee, Centralised Service, Bahraich. The suspension order which in W.P. No. 3087 of 1981 is contained in Annexure 6 states that in accordance with the decision dated 5th June, 1981 taken by the District Administrative Committee of the Centralised Service Bahraich the petitioner was being placed under suspension with immediate effect. The petitioners in all the writ petitions have challenged the suspension order on various grounds, the main ground being that the power of suspension did not vest in it and could not be exercised by the District Administrative Committee in the face of the statutory rules 13 and 14 contained in the aforesaid Rules of 1976. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite-parties the suspension orders were sought to be justified on the ground that they were passed by District Committee which was the appointing authority of the petitioners and consequently it was competent to suspend them. We are not concerned with the justification on merits given for the suspension because the matter has been argued and confined only as to the legality of the orders issued by the Secretary of the Administrative Committee in pursuance of the decision taken by the District Administrative Committee.

(3.) A perusal of rule 13 of the aforesaid Rules will indicate that the District Committee shall be appointing authority of the members of the Centralised Service. Sub-rule (3) of this rule empowers the Chairman to suspend a member of the Centralised Service with the prior concurrence of the Assistant Registrar. There is another rule, namely, rule 14 according to which the member secretary of the District Committee shall have the power of suspending a member of the Centralised Service with the prior concurrence of the Assistant Registrar. Now the contention of the petitioners learned counsel is that the power of suspension in this case has neither been exercised by the Chairman with the prior concurrence of the Assistant Registrar as required by rule 13 nor by the member secretary with similar concurrence of the Assistant Registrar as contemplated by rule 14, and consequently, the suspension orders are bad in law. Learned counsel for the opposite-parties has tried to justify the suspension orders passed by the District Administrative Committee on two grounds. Firstly, his contention was that the power of appointment having been vested in the District Committee the said Committee could also exercise the powers of suspension with the aid of Sec. 16 of the General Clauses Act. So far as this contention is concerned, we are not inclined to accept the same for the simple reason that Sec. 16 speaks of cases where the power to make appointment is conferred on a particular authority by an Uttar Pradesh Act and only then the power of suspension would be exercise able by the said authority. In the instant case, the power has not been conferred on the District Committee by the provision on an Uttar Pradesh Act but it has been conferred by rule 13 of the aforesaid Rules. In terms, therefore, Sec. 16 is not applicable. Our other reason for not accepting this contention is that Sec. 16 itself speaks that the appointing authority shall have the power to make suspension unless a different intention appears. The power of appointment has not been conferred on the District Committee by any Uttar Pradesh Act by the said Rules and the said Rules do contain a provision from which a different intention appears therefore, the appointing authority in the circumstances will not have the power to make suspension in pursuance of the principle underlying Sec. 16 of the General Clauses Act. Such different intention will be clearly inferred from the specific provisions contained in. Rules 13 and 14 where the power of suspension in one case has been given to the Chairman to be exercised with the prior concurrence of the Assistant Registrar and in the other case, the Member - Secretary will also exercise the power subject to the same condition of concurrence of the Assistant Registrar. All these provisions indicate a different intention and therefore, it cannot be said that the appointing authority could still exercise the powers of suspension even in the face of specific provisions in different terms in the same rules, namely, rules 13 and 14. We are aware of the cases where an authority delegating a power to another authority or officer is not divested of the power to exercise the same itself but that again is subject to. an intention or provision to the contrary. Sec. 16, General Clauses Act does not speak of a provision to the contrary. It only speaks of a provision by which a different intention appears, and not looking to the provisions of rules 13 and 14, it is obvious that a different intention certainly appears when the Chairman and the member - Secretary have been given the power to suspend with the prior concurrence of the Assistant Registrar.