(1.) THIS is a plaintiff's second appeal. A suit was filed by Munna Lal for specific performance of an agreement dated 15-2-1969 on the allegations that (Shrimati) Krishna Kumari, his sister, was a co-sharer to the extent of 1/7th share in the disputed house. She was residing with her mother and needed money for her marriage. Consequently she entered into an agreement with Munna Lal, her brother, on 15-2- 1969, to sell her 1/7th share of the house in question, for a consideration of Rs. 800. The entire sum was paid in advance. It was agreed that within two years of her marriage, Shrimati Krishna Kumari defendant No. 1, shall execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. In the event of default he will be entitled to get the same executed through court. It was further alleged that after the marriage of defendant No. 1 she was asked several times to execute the sale deed but she avoided the same. On 8-2-1971, Shrimati Krishna Kumari executed a sale deed in favour of Shrimati Raj Kumari defendant No. 2 with respect to the same property for a consideration of Rs. 1,000. THIS sale deed was duly registered. It is also alleged that at the time of the execution of the sale deed defendant No. 2 knew very well about the agreement of the sale which existed between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1. The plaintiff thus prayed for a decree of specific performance of the contract. In the alternative, a prayer was made for a decree for Rs. 800. with interest.
(2.) THE defendants contested the suit. Defendant No. 1 admitted the allegations in the plaint with regard to the agreement but alleged that she was always willing to execute the sale deed but the plaintiff committed default. As such she subsequently transferred the same in favour of defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 2 contested the suit on the grounds inter alia that at the time of the execution of the agreement between defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 was a minor and as such the agreement was void. It was also pleaded that no consideration of Rs. 800 had passed between the parties. Defendant No. 2 further pleaded that she is a bona fide purchaser for value and as such the plaintiff was not entitled to any decree against her.
(3.) THE contention on behalf of the respondents' counsel is that the considerations which apply to purchasers of property in cases where the same is transferred by ostensible owner under S. 41 Transfer of Property Act are different from S. 19 (b) Specific Relief Act. I have been referred to a number of cases by the counsel for the parties.