KALLOO Vs. BOARD OF REVENUE U P ALLAHABAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY means of this writ petition the petitioners have prayed for quashing the judgment of the learned Members, Board of Revenue, dated 17-81977 in Second Appeal No. 319 (z) of 1970-71 Jalaun-Kalloo v. Smt. Brij Rani etc.

(2.) IT appears that the second appeal has been decided in terms of a compromise dated 20-6-1975. The petitioner Kalloo gave an application in the second appeal on 21-2-1977 with the allegations that he had become major and the compromise filed on his behalf was fraudulent and not binding upon him. He also expressed that he had become major and he knew well about his good and evil and that he was not willing to accept the compromise entered into by his mother (see Annexure-6 attached with the writ petition ).

(3.) I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. In my opinion, this writ petition deserves to be allowed. When the petitioner Kalloo had brought to the notice of the second Appellate Court that he had become major and he knew about his good and evil, it was required of the second Appellate Court to examine the question whether the petitioner Kalloo should be permitted to prosecute the appeal in his own right in the circumstances of the, present case after giving due notice to the guardian of the minors and to the Respondents. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has drawn my attention to the ruling reported in AIR 1966 Punjab 471, Daulat Ram v. Surinder Kumar wherein a Division Bench of that Court has referred to several cases and has arrived at the following conclusion in paragraph 4 of the reported judgment: - "i am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid settlement of the law. I am not prepared to hold that merely because proceedings could be lawfully carried on by the quondam guardian in a litigation in which the minor is involved would confer on the quondam guardian power to enter into a contract on behalf of a minor who had ceased to be a minor when the contract was entered into. It is not disputed before us that a decree by consent is a decree passed on the basis of a contract. I am therefore, clearly of the view that the learned single Judge was right in his view that the consent decree, in the circumstances of the present case, will not bind the minor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "