SARJU Vs. D.D.C. AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Orders dated 27th Sept. 1971 and 26th July 1972 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation deciding the revision in terms of compromise and rejecting restoration application because petitioner's son appeared to have entered into compromise pre-assailed in this petition.

(2.) What happened that long after publication of statement of principles u/s 19 and even after decision of appeals etc., arising out of objections filed u/s 20 opposite parties filed a time barred objection which was rejected by Consolidation Officer. In appeal the opposite party produced in application purported to have been on behalf of petitioner accepting the claim of opposite party that a chak may be allotted to him near his house. As application was of a date prior to the date of decision by Consolidation Officer and petitioner bad not appeared to verify it the appellate authority was not satisfied of its authenticity, therefore did not accept it. The appeal was also dismissed. But before Deputy Director the opposite party succeeded. The revision was allowed in terms of compromise. When petitioner came to know of it he moved an application for setting aside of the order as he had not entered into any compromise. This application was rejected because the compromise was signed by petitioner's son. And in the application filed for setting aside of order the signature of son was not denied. It also appeared to Deputy Director that as compromise was signed by petitioner's son he must have been looking after petitioner's case, therefore it was not necessary to recall the order.

(3.) None of the orders passed by the Deputy Director can be maintained. It being admitted that compromise was not signed by petitioner it was not binding on him. But if it can be held that it was entered on his behalf by his agent or the son can be deemed to be agent or authorised to enter into compromise on his behalf then the petition must fail, There is no such finding. Nor there is any material on record from which an inference can be drawn that son had any express or implied authority, Learned counsel for opposite party placed various provisions of contract Act and urged that courts have inferred implied agency and held master bound for the act of his servant. According to learned counsel on same principle the petitioner should be held bound for the act of his son and an inference of implied agency may be drawn. The analogy of master and servant apart from being un-applicable the argument proceeds on misconception of the authority to enter into compromise. It is doubtful if even a lawyer who undoubtedly is an agent of the client can enter into compromise without any authority. The Deputy Director committed manifest error of law in inferring agency or authority only because son was looking after the case of his father.