BAJMUDDIN ALIAS MIYAN Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition u/Sec. 482 CrPC with a prayer that the proceedings pending in the Court of the Magistrate u/Sec. 60 Excise Act may be quashed on the following grounds :-

(2.) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. In my view this petition has no force.

(3.) THE rule of interpretation is that the provisions of a statute should be interpreted in a harmonious manner so that there should be no clash between interpreting one provision in relation to the other. If the intention of the Legislature was that in cases where investigation is not finished within six months, the Magistrate should not take cognizance on a police report, some such words should have been added either in Section 190 or 195 CrPC. After all, when a bar is to be put in the way of a Court taking cognizance and when there is a specific provision like Section 195 CrPC which comes subsequent to Section 167 CrPC there was nothing to stop the legislature in mentioning a sub-section or a clause to this Section 195 CrPC that in cases where investigation was not concluded within a period of six months and when permission was not obtained from the Magistrate to continue investigation, cognizance by a Magistrate on a police report which is in the shape of charge sheet will be barred. Indeed, the limitation clause says that a charge sheet could be submitted in cases under Section 60 Excise Act within one year from the date of the offence. That would suggest that limitation in such cases would arise only after expiry of one year, meaning thereby that investigating agency was given option to file or submit a charge sheet in each cases up to a period of one year. Indeed, by enacting sub-section (6) of Section 167 CrPC which provides for an application being moved to the Sessions Judge against the order of a Magistrate under sub-section (5) of Section 167, for investigation to be continued, it gone to show that no finality is attached as an order passed under sub-section (i) meaning thereby that merely because the Legislature wanted investigation to be completed as expeditiously as possible that is to say within six months without obtaining permission from the Magistrate, the idea was to expedite hearing of a case. It would not go to show that the Legislature intended that for want of delayed investigation in a cognizable case the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take cognizance should be deemed to be barred on account of that delay. Moreover, the scheme of the Act shows that the Investigating officer having started investigation, can only do two things, namely, he can submit a so-called final report under Section 169 CrPC or he can submit a so-called charge sheet under Section 178 CrPC. In both these eventu- alities he has to submit his report to the Magistrate concerned, meaning thereby that on his own he has no right to release the accused without intervention by the Magistrate concerned. Both these types of reports when submitted to the Magistrate concerned, have to be acted upon by the Magistrate under the provisions of Section 190 CrPC. In such an eventuality, the Magistrate, on submission of so-called final report, can either accept the final report or direct further investigation or take cognizance irrespective of the fact that the police has, after forming an opinion, submitted a final report. That being so, it is obvious that after investigation is proceeded with by a police officer, it is the Magistrate who, in the final analysis, has to act in three ways noted above on receipt of either a final report or a charge sheet. That being so, the argument that once the investigation is not completed within six months, ipso-facto an accused has to be let off for want of the same, looses force and there can be no such interpretation that merely because investigation proceeded after six months without obtaining order of the Magistrate, the accused on that account alone is entitled to be discharged of the offence with which he was initially suspected to have committed the same. In these circumstances specially in this case when cognizance has been taken by a Magistrate on the basis of a charge sheet submitted by the police it cannot be urged that simply because investigation was continued after months, if at all, without the permission of the Magistrate had no right to take cognizance in respect of such a charge sheet, I would, however, like to emphasise here that it should be the duty of the Investigating Officers to finish the investigation in a summons case within six months and if they think that it is not likely to be finished within the period then they must obtain permission from the Magistrate to continue investigation in a summons case beyond the period of six months. I hope the investigating agencies are familiar with this provision and they are expected to follow it strictly in future.