LAWS(ALL)-1982-1-26

STATE OF U P Vs. PHOOL CHAND AGARWAL

Decided On January 27, 1982
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Appellant
V/S
PHOOL CHAND AGARWAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a second appeal by the State of Uttay Pradesh, Hem Chandra Joshi, District Industries Officer has been added as the second appellant. The two respondents who are indisputably the owners of a house situate at Vikasnagar in the district of Dehradun the boundaries of which are described at the foot of the plaint, instituted the suit giving rise to the present second appeal, against the State of Uttar Pradesh, the said Hem Chandra Joshi, District Industries Officer Dehradun and K. N. Rai. Foreman. Training-cum-Extension Centre. Vikasnagar tor possession over the house and for compensation for use and occupation, or mesne profits at Rs. 200/- per month for the period commencing 1st March. 1974 up to the date of delivery of possession over the house to the Plaintiffs. The facts as alleged in the plaint were that in August, 1980, the then District Industries Officer, Dehradun, approached Ramesh Chandra, the second plaintiff for taking the house on rent for the residence and office of the Incharge or Foreman, of the Training cum-Extension Centre, Vikasnagar. The second plaintiff, it is alleged, "offered to give the same on monthly rent of Rs. 200/-.", which was accepted by the then District Industries Officer by letter dated 22nd Aug. 1968, but certain additions and alterations were required to be carried out and it was agreed that the house would be taken after the same were carried out. That having been done, the then Incharge of the Trainmg-cum-Extension Centre, Vikasnagar, took the house on 1st Oct 1968 at the agreed rent of Rs. 200/- per month for five years and the second plaintiff executed, as the lessor, on 1st Oct. 1968, a lease deed in duplicate on the form supplied by the office of the District Industries Officer. Dehradun, and his signatures having been witnessed, the same was transmitted for due execution on behalf of Government of U. P. as the lessee.

(2.) The plaintiff proceeds on to allege that the second plaintiff believes that the deed had not been executed on behalf of the lessee, nor was the same registered, and under the circumstances "no valid lease existed between the Government and the plaintiffs; nor the relationship of landlord and tenant, or lessor and lessee has ever come into existence." and that the occupation of the Incharge, Training-com-Extension Centre. Vikasnagar (Foreman, Rajkiya Prashikshan Evam Prasar Kendra) "purporting to be on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh has all along been permissive." It is then alleged that the stipulated period of five years having expired, the further occupation of the house by the Incharge, Training-cum-Extension Centre, Vikasnagar, has become unauthorised and illegal. This is followed by the allegation that the property could be let out on a monthly rent of more than Rs. 200/- and that the amount of Rs. 1400/- was due for the period 1st August, 1973 to 28th Feb. 1974 but on the service of the notice dated 2nd March, 1974 by the plaintiffs, the amount of Rs. 1400/- had been received by the plaintiffs and the defendants were in arrears from 1st Mar. 1974 onwards.

(3.) The defence was that the property was taken on rent for a period of five years and the defendant "did continue in the property as tenant since thereafter." It was denied that the occupation of the house by the Incharge, Training-cum-Extension Centre was unauthorised and illegal; that the property was occupied by the State of Uttar Pradesh and the said centre had no independent existence apart from the State. The liability to pay rent at the agreed rate was admitted but the claim of compensation for use and occupation was denied. The claim for possession was also refuted. The plea of undervaluation and deficiency in court-fees was also raised. In para 24 of the written statement, under the additional pleas, it was said that "in any case the plaintiff had himself executed the lease deed and it is for the defendant to complete the same in case it has not been completed. The lease deed is operative and binding on the plaintiff and the plaintiff is not entitled to challenge the same. It was then claimed that the house was held by the defendant as a tenant on payment of rent from the coffers of the Government which was accepted as such by the plaintiff and that the compliance of the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution has been fulfilled by implication. It was further pleaded that the contract had been ratified by holding over and payment of rent and retaining the possession, it was pleaded that "Article 299 of the Constitution is for the benefit of the defendant and it did not give any cause of action to the plaintiff to challenge the non-compliance thereof." It was then pleaded that no contract was being enforced by the suit and the provisions of Article 299 had been enacted "to enable the parties to enforce the contract" and "as such the non-compliance of Article 299 does not give any cause of action to the plaintiff to maintain this suit." Lastly, it was pleaded that "after the period of lease the plaintiffs has accepted the defendant as his tenant by holding over and by the provisions of U. P. Act XIII of 1972" that the plaintiff has also elected to treat the defendant as tenant and is now estopped from challenging the said character of the defendant and its interest in the property and finally the tenancy between the parties can be created by payment of rent and delivery of possession according to law which has been done in this case as such valid tenancy between the parties has been created by operation of law.