MAYA RAM Vs. RAM DAYAL AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Maya Ram, the Appellant filed a suit Under Sec. 209 of the UP ZA Act for the ejectment of the Respondents. The suit was decreed and the decree was upheld in second appeal by the Board of Revenue by an order dated 15th October, 1969. Subsequently, on 4th December, 1959, the Respondents filed an application before the Board praying for a review, or in the alternative, for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court. Notices were issued on this application. On return of the notices, both the parties applied that proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act had commenced in the village where the land in dispute was situate and therefore, the hearing of the application be stayed Under Sec. 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The Board thereupon stayed the hearing of the application.

(2.) Objections as to title were filed in Consolidation proceedings. Ultimately, in revision the Joint Director took the view that the decision of the Board of Revenue dated 15th October, 1959, operated as res -judicata in the Consolidation proceedings. On this basis, the claim of Maya Ram was upheld. Aggrieved, the Respondents filed a writ petition. A learned Single Judge, relying upon Ram Adhar Singh v/s. Ram Roop Singh, 1968 AWR 14 SC held that the judgment of the Board of Revenue had not become final. It was open to the Consolidation authorities to decide the question of title themselves. On this view, the writ petition was allowed and the order of the Joint Director was set aside.

(3.) The Board of Revenue had decided the second appeal on 15th October, 1959. On that day, the decree became final so far as the Board of Revenue was concerned. The Respondents filed an application for review cum certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court. The pendency of an application for review does not take away the operative efficacy of a decree passed by a court. The decree remains executable and in force so long as it is not set aside either by way of a review or by an appellate decree. Neither of these two events had happened. The review application was not allowed, with the result that the decree dated 15th October, 1959, remained in force. The pendency of the review application not having any adverse effect upon the binding nature of the decree, the fact that the hearing of that application was stayed would equally be ineffective to take away the enforceability of the decree. Merely applying for a certificate of fitness to appeal will equally not affect the finality of the decree. In case the certificate had been granted and an appeal had been lodged, it could then be said that since the decree was under appeal, its finality was affected. Mere pendency of the application for certificate could not, in our opinion, affect the decree.