KHAIRULLAH Vs. BADRL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal has been filed by plaintiff Khairullah and arises under the following circumstances: The appellant had filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 1488/-with costs against the respondent in the court of Munsif, Gorakhpur. The suit was decreed by the Munsif on 14-7-1970 for a sum of Rs. 1488/- with pendente lite and future interest. The defendant appealed and raised the point that during the pendency of the suit before the Munsif U. P. Act 14 of 1970 by which sub-sections (2) and (3) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 were amended had come into force. By this amendment in sub- sec tion (2) of Section 15 subject to the excep tions specified in the Schedule and to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in force a U suits of a civil nature of which value does not exceed Rs. 1000/-were made cognizable by the Court of Small Causes and by amendment in sub-section (3) the State Government was empowered to direct that all suits of a civil nature of which value does not exceed Rs. 2000/-shall be cognizable by the Court of Small Causes mentioned in the order. U. P. Act 14 of 1970 was published in the U. P. Ga zette on 8-4-1970. The point raised before the lower appellate Court was that on ac count of the bar created by Section 16 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 read with this amendment jurisdiction of the Munsif to try the suit was taken away and the jurisdiction to try the suit became vest ed exclusively in the Judge, Small Causes, exercising jurisdiction over cases upto a valuation of Rs. 2000/-. This argument was accepted by the lower appellate Court. It was held that on account of amendment of Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 by U. P. Act 14 of 1970 jurisdiction of the Civil Court was taken away to try a suit of the present nature and that the Munsif had no jurisdiction to de cide the suit after this amendment. The appeal was allowed. The judgment and decree of the Munsif were set aside and the plaint was ordered to be returned for pre sentation, to the proper court. It is against this order that the present appeal is directed.

(2.) THE first submission of learned counsel is that U. P. Act 14 of 1970 did not contain any provision relating to pend ing suits and inasmuch as amendment in Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act did not in terms apply retros pectively it should be held that the jurisdic tion of the civil Court remained unaffected in respect of this pending suit. This argu ment is devoid of substance because it is plain that the amendment in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 15 effected by U. P. Act 14 of 1970 related to procedural mat ter; because it is well settled that all proce dural amendments should take effect retros pectively; because in mere procedure or the forum the subject has no vested right. This is so especially when there is no saving pro vision in U. P. Act 14 of 1970 to protect pending actions and suits and to provide that pending actions and suits shall continue to be governed notwithstanding the amend ment by the old procedure. There is, there fore, no validity in the argument of the learned counsel that the amendment of Sec tion 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 did not affect pending suits. On the other hand, it is quite clear that the amendment having related to procedural matters applied with retrospective effect and therefore affected the forum of pending suits also with the result that after 8-4-1970 in view of Section 16 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 jurisdiction of the regular Civil Court was taken away to de cide suits covered by sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 15 of the Act of 1887. Conse quently, the Munsif had no jurisdiction to decide the suit and the decree passed by him would be a nullity.

(3.) THE only other point made by the learned counsel was that the respondent had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Munsif; raised no objection before him that he had no jurisdiction to try the suit and, therefore, he was prevented from raising the objection of jurisdiction before the lower appellate Court. This argument is also without force as neither acquiescence nor consent of parties can confer jurisdiction on a Court which lacks inherent jurisdiction and a decree passed without jurisdiction is a nullity. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Pas-wan, AIR 1954 SC 340 the Supreme Court observed as follows:-