NANHUN Vs. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE appellant, Nanhu was a sub-tenant of two plots 27 and 201. A suit for his ejectment was filed by Par-gan Singh, deceased husband of respondent No. 4 under Section 175 of the U. P. Ten ancy Act and a decree was passed for his ejectment on November 5, 1943. The dec ree was executed and possession was deliver ed to Pargan Singh on May 25, 1944. Not withstanding the decree and Dakhaldihani in the suit aforesaid the name of the appel lant continued to be recorded as a sub-ten ant, which on an application being made by Pargan Singh was subsequently expung ed in 1363 F and thereafter the name of Par gan Singh continued to be recorded in vil lage papers. Subsequently, the village in which the aforesaid two plots are situate was brought under consolidation operations and in the basic year Khatauni the name of Pargan Singh stood recorded. An objection was filed by the appellant under Section 12 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act claiming Adhivasi and thereafter sirdari rights on the ground that he was recorded as an occupant in 1356 F. The claim of the appellant was repelled by the consolida tion Officer and his order was upheld in appeal and revision by the Settlement Offi cer (Consolidation) and the Deputy Director of Consolidation respectively. These various orders passed by the consolidation authori ties were challenged by the appellant in a writ petition which was dismissed by a learn ed Single Judge. Hence this special appeal.

(2.) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has urged that it was only the entry in 1356 F which was to be looked into and the learned Single Judge was not right in ob serving that since the appellant had failed to prove his possession on 30th June, 1948 he could not be given the benefit of the entry in 1356 F. In support of his contention that neither the question of possession in 1356 F nor the correctness of the entry of 1356 F wherein the name of the appellant was ac tually recorded as a sub-tenant could be gone into subsequent to the date of vesting, he relied upon Mosim Ali v. Ganga Prasad, AIR 1966 All 356 and Sri Nath Singh v. Board of Revenue, U. P., 1968 All LJ 920= (AIR 1968 SC 1351). In our opinion none of these two cases is applicable to the facts of the present case. As has been found by the consolidation authorities the appellant was actually ejected and possession was deli vered to Pargan Singh on May 25, 1944. It is not the appellant's case that he trespassed over the land or that the_ land was again let out to him after the said date. His spe cific case on the other hand is that notwith standing the decree and delivery of posses sion in the suit under Section 175 he conti nued to be in possession. This case has not been accepted by the consolidation authori ties. Once possession was delivered to Par gan Singh on May 25, 1944 there would be a presumption of continuity of possession in his favour. See Nathoo Lal v. Durga Pra sad, AIR 1954 SC 355.

(3.) IN this view of the matter we find no error of law apparent on the face of the record in the orders of the consoli dation authorities and the special appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed