DILAWAR SINGH Vs. GRAM SAMAJ

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN consolidation proceedings Smt. Tulsa was allotted a chak in lieu of certain plots of which she was the recorded tenure-holder. While the consolidation operations were still in progress she died in 1962. On her death, the appellant made an ap plication under Section 12 of the Con solidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for mutation of his name in place of her name claiming to be her heir, being the daughter's son. Another application was filed by one Nathu Singh. The Gaon Samai also entered the arena claiming that Smt, Tulsa had died without leaving any heir and her property had vested in the Gaon Samai. The Consolidation Officer, by his order dated 13-5-1963. upheld the claim of the present appellant and rejected the claim put forward by the Gaon Samai and Nathu Singh. The Gaon Samai preferred an appeal which was allowed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) by an order dated 28th November. 1963 holding that the pro perty of Smt. Tulsa had vested in the Gaon Samai. Against the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). the appellant filed a revision on 12th De cember. 1963. Before the revision was filed, a notification under Section 52 of the Act was issued on 7th December, 1963. The revision was dismissed on the ground that after the notification under Section 52 of the Act, the revision could not be entertained. The order of the Deputy Director (Consolidation) was challenged in this Court by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. A learned single Judge dismissed the peti tion and hence this appeal.

(2.) IT is admitted that when the notification under Section 52 of the Act was issued, no revision had been filed challenging the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The question for consideration is whether the revision filed on December 12. 1963 was main tainable.

(3.) A proceeding whether initiate ed through a suit or an application em braces within its ambit all the rights available to a party by way of appeals, second appeals or revisions. In Garika pati v. Subbiah Choudhry. AIR 1957 SC 540. S. R. Das, C. J. delivering the majority judgment laid down that the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic entity and are to be re garded as one legal proceeding and that the right of appeal was not a mere matter of procedure but was a substan tive right. The Court further observed that the institution of the suit carried with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force were preserved to the parties thereto till the suit was finally decided and that right of appeal was a vested right which accrued to the litigant from the date the is com menced and this vested right could be taken away by a subsequent enactment if it so provided expressly or by neces sary intendment. It is thus clear that the right of a litigant to take the pro ceeding to a superior Court, if an ad verse order is passed against him. Comes into existence the moment a proceeding is initiated and it continues till the Us continues. The right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the Institution of the suit or appeal and not by the law that prevails at the date of the decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. Applying this principle it has to be held that on the filing of a claim or objection before the Consolida tion Officer, certain rights vested in a party to take the proceeding to the superior authorities. That right could not be taken away by a subsequent en actment unless it was expressly or by necessary implication so provided. There is nothing in Section 52 of the Act which either expressly or by necessary impli cation takes away that right.