(1.) IN March 1970 the peti tioner was granted a licence for a double barrel gun. On some information having been Lald before the Sub-Divisional Officer by the Superintendent of Police to the effect that the petitioner had been bound down to keep peace for a period of one year under Sections 107/117, Cr. P. Code, the Sub-Di visional Officer passed an order on 8-5-1970 suspending the licence and directed a show cause notice to issue to the petitioner why his licence be not cancelled. The petitioner appealed to the District Magistrate who up held the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and dismissed the appeal. It is against these two orders, one passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer suspending the licence, and the se cond passed by the District Magistrate as an appellate authority that this petition under Article 226 is directed. It is prayed that the said two orders be quashed by a writ of certiorari as the orders are not in conformity with the law.
(2.) THE first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the order suspending the licence passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 8-5-1970 was vitiated as no reasonable opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to show cause and no notice ever was served upon him that on the information Lald by the Superinten dent of Police the petitioner's licence was intended to be suspended and cancelled. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on a learned Single Judge's decision in Jugul Kishore v. District Magistrate, 1971 All WR (HC) 727 where it was held that a reasonable opportunity must be afforded before an order of suspension of arms licence can be passed. This view of the learned Judge also finds support from a Division Bench decision of this Court in Jai Narain Rai v. District Magistrate, Azam-garh, AIR 1966 All 265. But the Supreme Court has reiterated the law as to the scope and applicability of principles of natural justice in Union of India v. J. N. Sinha, AIR 1971 SC 40 as follows:
(3.) IT will be seen that sub-section (5) of Section 17 of the Arms Act requires an order in writing by the licencing authority recording the reasons for suspending or re voking a licence. There is no express pro vision in that section to give a prior notice to the licensee to show cause why his licence be not suspended or revoked as the case be. By Section 18 of the said Act the order passed by the licensing authority sus pending or revoking the licence is made ap pealable and the requirement of sub-section (5) of that section is that no appeal shall be disposed of unless the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The appellate provisions do not put any restriction on the scope of the appeal except that a period of limitation has been fixed. It is open to a licencee to place all the material in support of his case before the appellate authority. Then reading the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 as an inte grated scheme for exercise of the power of suspension or revocation of licence, it is clearly brought out that a licencee is afford ed ample protection by the statute which imposes a duty on the licencing authority to give reasons in writing for revoking or suspending a licence and then affording a licencee an opportunity to be heard by the appellate authority on all the relevant as pects of the matter. As the Supreme Court observed: "If the statutory provisions can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice the court should do so." In my judgment the scheme under the two Sections 17 and 18 of the Arms Act, as explained above is found to be consistent with the basic principles of natural justice, no matter a prior notice to the licencee is not required to be given by the licencing autho rity to show cause why the licence be not suspended or revoked. However, I do not propose to decide this petition on the basis of the contention of the petitioner that ifailure to give a prior notice to show cause I vitiates the proceedings. Hence, it is not necessary for me to make a reference to a larger Bench.