BRINDABAN Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner is a constable in the police force and in the year 1967 he was posted at out-post Surai in police station, Konch, district Jalaun. According to the petitioner his relations with the station officer, police station, Konch, were not cordial and he anticipated trouble from him. For this reason he sent an application to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Kanpur Range, Kanpur praying that he be transferred outside the district. In May, 1967 the petitioner was transferred to police station, Kotwali, Orai, On March 31, 1968 one Har Dayal Singh lodged an F. I. R. at police station, Kotwali against his brother Dwarka Singh and Anr. of a non-cognizable offence. It is alleged that the petitioner went to the village Rewa where the complainant resided, extracted a bribe of Rs. 50 from Har Dayal Singh and then compelled the parties to enter into compromise. On April 3, 1968 Har Dayal Singh lodged a report against the petitioner under Sections 161/419/420, Indian Penal Code. On the basis of this report a case was registered against the petitioner and was investigated by Sri Karan Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police. At this stage the petitioner sent another application to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Kanpur Range, requesting his transfer outside the district. In this application the petitioner mentioned that the Superintendent of Police, Jalaun was himself responsible for the report, that it had been decided to obtain a final report on the F. I. R. and to start departmental proceedings against the petitioner. The investigating officer, in fact, submitted a final report on April 23, 1968. Thereafter the petitioner was ordered to appear before the Superintendent of Police on June 1, 1968 at 9 A. M. to receive a charge-sheet under Section 7 of the Police Act. The petitioner in obedience of this order appeared before the Superintendent of Police on June 1, 1968. Hs was served with a charge-sheet by the Superintendent of Police. According to the petitioner the Superintendent of Police abused him and told him that he would get the petitioner removed from service. On the sums day the Superintendent of Police passed an order confining the petitioner to the orderly room for the day for appearing in shabby uniform without turban before him. The petitioner, being apprehensive that he may not receive justice at the hands of the Superintendent of Police, made a third application to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police on June 1, 1958 requesting that he as well as the departmental proceedings b transferred out of the district. The enquiry was held by the Superintendent of Police himself. On June 4,1968 the petitioner applied to the Superintendent of Police praying for a stay of the departmental proceedings pending the decision of the Deputy inspector General of Police on his application for transfer of the departmental proceedings. This application was rejected by the Superintendent of Police and he continued with the enquiry proceedings. After completing the enquiry the Superintendent of Police recorded his findings against the petitioner finding him guilty of the main charge of accepting a bribe of Rs. 50 from Har Dayal Singh. The report of the Superintendent of Police is dated July 22, 1968. A copy of these findings was served on the petitioner and the petitioner was asked to show cause within eight days why the punishment of dismissal be not awarded to him. The petitioner submitted his explanation. By order dated August 7, 1968 the Superintendent of Police dismissed the petitioner from service. Against this order the petitioner preferred an appeal and then a revision but both were dismissed. He has now come to this Court by way of petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(2.) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has challenged the disciplinary proceedings as well as the order of the Superintendent of Police dismissing the petitioner from service on the sole ground that the Superintendent of Police was biased against the petitioner,

(3.) BEFORE considering the material on which the learned Counsel places reliance in support of this contention, it would be proper to notice the principles laid down by the Supreme Court for judging the question of bias. In Manak Lai v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 425, the Supreme Court observed? It is well-settled that every member of a tribunal that is called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially; and it is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that Judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment, the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done. But where pecuniary interest is not attributed but instead a bias is suggested, it often becomes necessary to consider whether there is a reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of a bias and whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the litigant or the public at large a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice. It would always be a question of fact to be decided in each case. The Supreme Court further observed that these principles applied not only to regular courts but to all tribunals and bodies which were given jurisdiction to determine judicially the rights of parties.