(1.) This special appeal is directed against a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court dismissing a second appeal arising out of an execution proceeding. One Suraj Bhan had obtained a money decree against one Sardar Singh. The decree-holder sought execution of the decree by attachment of various properties, one of them being an amount alleged to be payable to the judgment-debtor Sardar Singh by the appellant, the British Transport Co. Ltd. Delhi. This amount was said to have been payable as being due in respect of hire of a bus which had been leased out to the appellant company at a rate of Rs. 8/- per diem on behalf of Sardar Singh and Babu Singh, joint owners of the bus. It was further alleged that in the rent the share of Sardar Singh and Babu Singh was half and half, so that the appellant company was liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 4/-per diem to Sardar Singh. The decree-holder sought execution of the decree by taking garnishee proceedings in respect of the share of the hire money due from the appellant company to Sardar Singh. The application for obtaining the garnishee order was presented on 1st of June, 1942, by the decree-holder in the Court of Munsif, Agra, on the execution side. The Court proceeded to pass orders for execution of the decree and in execution of the decree attached this debt alleged to be due from the appellant company to the judgment-debtor Sardar Singh. On 30th November, 1944, the appellant company filed objections in the garnishee proceedings. It has been noticed by the learned single Judge that notice of the garnishee proceedings was served on the appellant company at a much earlier stage and the objections were filed after the lapse of a long time, so that they were belated, and even then the appellant company did not specifically deny the case of the decree-holder respondent that the lorry had been hired to the company at the rate of Rs. 8/- per diem. At that stage no objection as to the jurisdiction of the Agra Court to take proceedings against the appellant company was taken either. Subsequently another objection was raised that the Court at Agra had no jurisdiction to take garnishee proceedings against the appellant company. The Trial Court dismissed all the objections including the objections that related to the merits of the amount due from the appellant company to the judgment-debtor Sardar Singh. The appellant company then filed a first appeal which was dismissed by the Civil Judge of Agra. The company then came up in second appeal and the present special appeal is directed against the judgment dismissing the second appeal.
(2.) One of the points that had arisen in these proceedings was as to the liability of the appellant company to another party to these proceedings viz. the Central Finance and Housing Company Limited, as that party was claiming that this bus had been given to Sardar Singh and Babu Singh by that party under a hire-purchase agreement and there having been a breach of the agreement that party was entitled to the return of the bus as it had continued to be the owner of the bus and was also entitled to certain mesne profits. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, who has appeared on behalf of the appellant, has however, stated that, since then, the dispute raised by the Central Finance and Housing Company Limited has been finally settled bv a decision of this Court in another appeal, as a result of which it has been held that Sardar Singh and Babu Singh were full owners of the bus and that the appellant company owed no liability to the Central Finance and Housing Company Limited. It was held that the appellant company was the lessee of the bus from Sardar Singh and Babu Singh.
(3.) In this special appeal two points have been urged before us by the learned counsel for me (Sic) first point urged is that the Court at Agra had no jurisdiction to take these garnishee proceedings and that the decision of the learned single Judge, that those proceedings were taken in exercise of jurisdiction vested in that Court, was not correct. The second point urged by the learned counsel is that the objection on merits, which was decided by the Trial Court, was based on admission of evidence which was not admissible under law and that was another error that had been committed by the lower Courts. These were the only two points that were urged by the learned counsel for the appellant before us.