BHARTIYA VIDYALAYA Vs. BANARSI DAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a defendant's special appeal against a judgment of a learned Single Judge by which the learned Single Judge allowed a second appeal, set aside the judgment of the lower appellate court and restored the decree of the trial court, decreeing a suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent for the ejectment of the defendant-appellant.

(2.) The appellant was a tenant of the respondent in an accommodation in the city of Kanpur. The respondent instituted a suit for the ejectment of the appellant on 20th Feb., 1947, mainly on two grounds, viz., that the defendant had raised certain constructions changing the nature of the structures let out to it and that the landlord needed the premises for his own personal use. When the suit was instituted, the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Ordinance, 1946 (U.P. Ordinance No. III of 1946) was in force. In view of the provisions of sub-Secs. (c) and (g) of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance, the suit filed by the respondent against the appellant on the two grounds mentioned above was maintainable without any permission of the District Magistrate. The Ordinance had been in force with effect from 1st Oct., 1946. While the suit was still pending in the trial court, the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, (U.P. Act III of 1947) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was published in the official gazette on March 1, 1947, after having received the assent of the Governor and the Governor-General. Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. I of the Act provides that the Act shall he deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of Oct., 1946, which was the date when the Ordinance mentioned above had originally come into force. Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 18 of the Act re-pealed the Ordinance No. III of 1946 and sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 18 of the Act provides that the provisions of the Ordinance shall be so read and construed as if they were amended by the Act in such manner as not to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Sec. 3 of the Act laid down certain restrictions on the right to institute suits for eviction of tenants. The material change brought about by the Act, which is relevant for the purpose of deciding this appeal before us, was that a suit for eviction of a tenant on the ground that the landlord needed the accommodation for his own personal use was no longer maintainable. On the other hand, a suit could be maintained if permission was obtained from the District Magistrate for institution of the suit. The findings of fact, which have become final, dis entitled the respondent from obtaining the decree for eviction of the appellant on the first ground mentioned above viz., that the latter had raised certain constructions changing the nature of the structures let out to it. It was held that no such material changes had been effected by the appellant. That point, being concluded by findings of fact, did not come up for decision again before the learned Single Judge in the second appeal, and, consequently, we are also not concerned with that ground in this special appeal.

(3.) The second ground, on which ejectment was sought in the plaint when the suit was instituted on 20th Feb., 1947, was, as we have mentioned earlier, that the landlord needed the premises for his own personal use. Before the suit could be decided, the Act came into force. The respondent, therefore, applied to the District Magistrate for permission. Such permission was granted on the 25th of Aug., 1947, by the Additional District Magistrate, Shri Hadi Hasan. The trial court, in dealing with this ground, held that the permission, which was granted by the Additional District Magistrate (Shri Hadi Hasan) on 25th Aug., 1947, was invalid because it was given on a ground mentioned in clause (c) of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act. He was of the view that the District Magistrate or any officer holding delegated powers from the District Magistrate could not give any permission on any of six specific grounds, mentioned in sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act and the suit, on these grounds, could be filed without any permission from the District Magistrate, so that, if the District Magistrate gave any permission on those grounds, it would have to be specifically proved in the criminal courts." The trial court, however, decreed the suit on the first ground that the appellant had raised constructions and made a material alterations to the accommodation which rendered it liable to eviction. The appellant, therefore, went up in first appeal and the first appellate court disagreed with the trial court on the first point. That court, as we have mentioned earlier, recorded findings of fact that there had been no raising of such constructions or material alterations as would render the present appellant liable to eviction under Sec. 3 of the Act without the permission of the District Magistrate. That view taken by the first appellate court justified the setting aside of the order of the trial court by the plaintiff-respondent sought to support the decree of the trial court by relying on the second ground which had been rejected by the trial court. The first appellate court held that the appeal before him arose out of a suit which had been instituted prior to the commencement of the Act and, consequently, the provisions of Sec. 3 of the Act could not he applied to this suit. The court also, therefore, disregarded the permission contained from the Additional District Magistrate, Shri Hadi Hasan, and held that no question of obtaining the permission from the District Magistrate prior to the filing of the suit could arise. Since the first appellate court took this view, the question that had to be considered by if was whether the suit could he decreed on one or more of the grounds mentioned. in Sec. 3 of the Act in view of the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Act. The court then proceeded to record findings of fact to the effect that the plaintiff-respondent had failed to prove the existence of any of the grounds mentioned in Sec. 3 of the Act, so that the plaintiff-respondent was held not to be entitled to a decree for eviction of the appellant. The appeal was, therefore, allowed and the suit of the plaintiff-respondent was dismissed.