MUNICIPAL BOARD KANPUR Vs. JANKI PRASAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal is directed against an order of acquittal passed on 1-6-1960 by a Magistrate First Class of Kanpur. The respondent No. 1 holds a licence, for selling edible oils and runs his shop at Kanpur while respondent No. 2 is a salesman thereat. On the 21st of July, 1959, at 10-30 a. m. the Food Inspector, Kanpur, went to the shop and found respondent No. 1 Janki Prasad working there. In the shop was stored linseed oil also. The Food Inspector took 7 chs. of that oil as sample after paying 47 nP. to respondent No. 1 as the price of the sample demanded by that respondent. The Food Inspector gave a notice in writing to respondent No. 1 that the sample had been taken for analysis and in the presence of the said respondent divided the linseed oil purchased by him into three parts delivering one of it to respondent No. 1. One of the parts which like other parts was also sealed by the Food Inspector, was sent to the Public Analyst to U. P. Government for examination who found it to be highly adulterated. The respondent No. 2 admitted to be the owner of the shop and respondent No. 1 to be the salesman thereat. The respondent No. 1 also admitted that he also sells articles at the shop. The respondents were therefore prosecuted under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, (No. XXXVII of 1954) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The learned Magistrate following the decision of this Court in State of U. P. v. Brij Mohan, 1960 All LJ 94 acquitted the respondents on the ground that linseed oil cannot be comprehended in the definition of 'food' given in the Act. The State has filed this appear against the order of acquittal under Section 417 Cr. P. C. The matter came up before our brother Mathur who taking the view that the decision in 1960 All LJ 94 required reconsideration, referred the whole case to a larger Bench. Thereupon the case was heard by a Division Bench consisting of our brothers Uniyal and Asthana. The Bench took the view that it was proper that the case should be heard by a Full Bench and consequently it has now come before us.

(2.) It is not in dispute that linseed oil was recovered from the possession of the respondents who had stored it for sale. The report of the Public Analyst clearly shows that the same was adulterated. Therefore if linseed oil can be covered by the definition of the word 'food' in the Act the order of acquittal passed in favour of the respondents would not be justified. The Act is an all-India Act. Before the Act was passed the various provinces or States had their separate statutes to prevent the adulteration of food. In Uttar Pradesh originally the U. P. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1912 (Act VI of 1912) was in force but it was replaced by the U. P. Pure Food Act, 1950 (Act No. XXXII of 1950). Similarly other States had their own special laws. By means of Section 25 of the Act all the State laws relating to adulteration of food stood repealed with the result that there came into existence a uniform law for the entire country. The necessity for a central legislation and a uniform law for the entire country had been felt ever since 1937 but the opportunity for enacting a central legislation was provided after the passing of the Constitution which made adulteration of food stuffs and other goods a subject for concurrent legislation. Section 2 (v) of the Act reads as follows:

(3.) It has been contended that the word 'ordinarily' qualifies the words "enters into'' and not "is used" occurring in Sub-clause (a) of Section 2 (v) of the Act. In our judgment the submission is not correct. The word 'ordinarily' qualifies both "enters into" as also "is used". If the legislature intended to confine the applicability of the word 'ordinarily' only to "enters into" the clause would have read like this :