BANSIDHAR JOSHI Vs. CHANDRA KUMAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a defendant's second appeal against the decision of the Second Additional Civil Judge, Agra decreeing the landlord's suit for recovery of arrears of rent. The plaintiff respondents are the owners of a house in the city of Agra. They filed an application before the learned Munsif under Section 7-B of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act for the ejectment of the tenant Bansidhar Joshi on the ground that he was in arrears of rent for more than three months. The tenant filed an objection under Sub-section (8) in which he admitted the tenancy but disputed the rate of rent alleged by the landlord who had claimed it at Rs. 50/-/- per mensem. The application was converted into a regular suit for recovery of arrears of rent. The learned Munsif held that the tenant had not agreed to pay Rs. 50/ per mensem and that the reasonable rate of rent was Rs. 20/-per mensem. He also held that the tenant was entitled to deduct the amount paid by him as house-tax, water tax and charges for the restoration of the electric supply. Accordingly he decreed tha landlord's suit for recovery of rent at Rs. 20/-per mensem minus a sum of Rs. 77/3/9 paid by him as house tax, water tax and electric charges.

(2.) On appeal the Additional Civil Judge disagreed with the trial court on the question of the rate of rent and held that there was an agreement between the parties fixing the rent at Rs. 50/- per mensem. He disbelieved the version of the tenant and accepted that of the landlord. He agreed with the trial court that the tenant was entitled to adjust against rent any amounts paid by him towards the house and water taxes but did not agree that he was entitled to deduct the electricity charges. Accordingly he modified the decision of the trial court and passed a decree for arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 50/- per mensem against the tenant who has now come to this Court in second appeal.

(3.) Mr. L. M. Pant, learned counsel for the appellant advanced the following arguments in support of this appeal. First, he contended that the appellate court had no jurisdiction as there is no right of appeal against the decree of the Munsif under Section 7-B. Learned counsel contended that the jurisdiction of the Munsif under Section 7-B is a special one and the ordinary right of appeal under Section 96 of C. P. C. is not available. Such a right could only arise under the statute creating the special jurisdiction. As Section 7-B provides for no appeal, it follows that the legislature intended the decree of the Munsif for arrears of rent under Section 7-11 to be final. I do not agree. Sub-section (8) of Section 7-B provides that if the applicant pays the necessary court fee within the time allowed, the application shall be treated as a plaint and the proceedings as a suit. The words "plaint" and "suit" indicate that the Munsif functions as an ordinary court. Any doubt is further removed by the requirement that the landlord must pay the necessary court fees. The Word "necessary" means court fee at the rate applicable to such a suit if it were filed as a suit ab initio. I think the Munsif is intended to function as an ordinary court, and, therefore, any decree passed by him would be appealable like any other decree. The appeal would lie to the court to which appeals from the decrees of the Munsif ordinarily lie. Learned counsel laid stress on the fact that Section 7-B confers on the Munsif the jurisdiction to try all suits for arrears of rent without any limitation as regards valuation. This fact, according to learned counsel, makes the jurisdiction of the Munsif a special one with no right of appeal. I do not think so. The fact that the Munsif can try suits of any valuation under Section 7-B does not make his Court any the less a Civil court. The pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif's court is fixed by law and can be enlarged or restricted by any other law in suitable cases. The extent of the pecuniary jurisdiction is irrelevant, in my opinion, to the question whether the Munsif functions as an ordinary court when trying a suit for the recovery of rent under Section 7-B. If he does, it follows that any decree passed by him in that section is appealable like any other decree.