SHRI KISHAN Vs. K S GANDHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondent No. 1, K. S. Gandhi (hereinafter referred to as Gandhi) filed a suit against the petitioner in the Court of the Judge Small Causes, Allahabad, for the recovery of a certain amount of money as rent from the petitioner for the premises 21, Canning Road, Allahabad. The suit was contested, inter alia, on the ground that the contract between the parties was void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the that Court decreed the suit. A revision application was filed before the learned District Judge, Allahabad, under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act which was allowed and the case remanded for trial to the Judge Small Cause Court. Thereafter a revision application was filed by the petitioner in this Court under Section 115, C.P.C., which was also dismissed on 1-11-1961 by Desai, C. J. and Ramabhadran, J. Thereafter the present petition was filed in this Court purporting to be under Articles 226 and 227 cf the constitution. The prayer in the petition is that the decree passed by the Judge Small Cause Court and revisional order passed by the learned District Judge, Allahabad, be quashed. There is no prayer for either setting aside or quashing the order passed by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

(2.) When this petition came up for hearing before me, wanted the learned counsel for the petitioner to satisfy me whether such a petition could be entertained. The proceedings initiated by the filing of the suit in the Court of the Judge Small Causes, so far as this Court is concerned, terminated when this Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction dismissed the revision application on 1-11-1961. It cannot be matter of dispute that the proceedings now sought to be started by the instant writ petition is a completely new and different proceeding. It is well known that while exercising powers under Article 226 of the constitution of India, this Court acts on the original side, me question, therefore, that arises is that after this court has finally decided the matter in dispute between the parties by means of its order dated 1-11-1961, can it pass a completely different order in exercise of its original jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution? In other words, can this Court speak with two mouths, and sitting in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction proclaim that the order passed by the learned District Judge does not require interference but sitting in the exercise of the powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution declare that the decree is liable to be set aside? It is in this connection that I have heard the learned counsel for the parties today and inasmuch as it appears to me that a writ petition under the present circumstances cannot be entertained, I have not gone into the merits of the case.

(3.) Clause 27 of the Letters Patent of this Court provided that