LAWS(ALL)-1962-5-17

RAJA DEO SINGH Vs. AKHTAR AHSAN

Decided On May 18, 1962
RAJA DEO SINGH Appellant
V/S
AKHTAR AHSAN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from a judgment of our brother Nigam dismissing the appellant's objection to the execution of a decree against him. The decree was a compromise decree and the relevant parts of it are paragraphs 4 and 5 which read as follows :

(2.) After having heard Sri B.K. Dhaon and Sri M.K. Seth we are left in no doubt that the objection of the appellant was sound and must be sustained. We have no doubt that what the parties intended was that the respondent should get under the compromise bonds of the face value of the amount found to be due to him from the appellant and not bonds of the market value of that amount. The words used in the compromise are "amount payable"; 6ut these are also the words used in the Zammdari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the rules framed thereunder for payment of the compensation to intermediaries in the form of bonds. Section 28 provides that "compensation tor acquisition" of estates under the Act shall be due as from the date of vesting and that in the case of the amount to be given in bonds there shall be paid interest from the date of vesting to the date of redemption of the bonds. Section 54 provides that "the amount payable as compensation" shall be at a certain rate. Section 55 deals with the amount of compensation payable to a thekedar. Section 65 provides that

(3.) When the parties entered into a compromise they obviously meant that the bonds of the face value of the amount calculated to be due from the appellant to the respondent would be given to the respondent; had they intended that the bonds of the market value of that amount should be given to him one would have expected express words to that effect in the compromise. The reference to the bonds and the amount found due meant bonds of the face value of that amount. This was made clearer by the provision that the respondent was to get the bonds direct from the Compensation Officer. It is immaterial that the Compensation Officer cannot give the bonds direct to the respondent [because he has to prepare them in the name of the appellant who was the intermediary], the tact still remains that the parties did contemplate that the respondent would get from the Compensation Officer bonds of the amount found to be due to him. The Compensation Officer would never take into consideration the market value of the bonds; whenever he has to give bonds in lieu of money, he will always give bonds of the face value equal to the amount to be paid. Even when he has to place at the disposal of a Court bonds of a certain amount he places bonds of the face value, and not the market value, of that amount at the disposal of the Court. When he has to give the bonds to an intermediary he gives him bonds of the face value of the compensation payable to him and it would be incongruous if he was to give to his creditor bonds of the market value of that amount. We, therefore, hold that bonds of the face value of the amount found to be due from the appellant to the respondent were liable to be attached.