LAWS(ALL)-1962-9-14

SETH CHAMPALAL RAMSWARUP Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

Decided On September 24, 1962
SETH CHAMPALAL RAMSWARUP, BEAWAR Appellant
V/S
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P. V.P. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Income-tax Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) has in pursuance of the directions given by this court dated 11th of December, 1957, allowing an application under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) submitted a statement of case and referred some questions of law to this court for answer. When the hearing of the case started before us a preliminary objection was taken by Mr. Gulati on behalf of the income-tax department (hereinafter referred to as the department) that this court has no jurisdiction to answer the questions of law referred to it and that it is the Rajasthan High Court alone which has jurisdiction in the matter. In order to appreciate this argument it is necessary to give certain dates. THE Tribunal rejected the application of the assessee under section 66(1) of the Act on the 7th of July, 1950, whereupon the assessee made an application to this court under section 66(2) of the Act some time in 1951. That application was allowed on the 11th of December, 1957, and the Tribunal was directed to submit a statement of case and refer some questions of law.

(2.) MR. Gulati has invited our attention to clause (8) of section 66 of the Act as amended by the Adaptation of Laws (No. 3) Order, 1956. That provision reads as unde :

(3.) IT is noteworthy that whereas there is a direct provision for the transfer of all proceedings pending before the Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer and before the High Courts of Bombay and Madhya Bharat to the High Court of Rajasthan, there is no provision for the transfer of the income-tax references pending in this court to the High Court of Rajasthan. IT is well settled that the question relating to the jurisdiction of a court or Tribunal has got to be determined on the basis of the conditions existing on the date when the suit or the proceedings were started. Thus, if on the date of the filing of the suit or the start of the proceedings a court had validly entertained the suit or the proceedings it would continue to be seized of it even though later on the area from which the suit or proceeding arises has gone out of the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of that court. This general rule has an exception the same being that if there is anything contained in any statutory provision to the contrary the question relating to jurisdiction of the court shall be governed by that provision. The view that we are taking finds support from the decision of the Federal Court in Venugopala Reddiar v. Krishnaswami Reddiar, AIR 1943 FC 24. In that case a suit was filed in an Indian court in respect of certain properties some of which were situated in Rangoon. The litigation was still pending when Burma Independence Act came into force and the question arose whether an Indian court should decide even in respect of properties situate in Burma. IT was contended before the Federal Court that under the municipal law a court of one State cannot decide in respect of the properties situated in another independent State. But their Lordships held that in view of the fact that the Burma Independence Act did not contain any provision which extinguished the jurisdiction of the Indian courts in respect of suits already filed relating to properties in Burma, the Indian courts had jurisdiction in the matter. We have already said above that there is nothing in Act XXXVII which requires either the transfer of the present case or dismissal of the present proceedings on the ground that we have no jurisdiction to proceed further and we do not see any reason why the rule laid down in Venugopala Reddiar v. Krishnaswami Reddiar, AIR 1943 FC 24 should not be followed in this case.