COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT SHRI KRISHNA GEETA RASTRIYA DEGREE COLLEGE Vs. VICECHANCELLOR V B S PURVANCHAL UNIVERSITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ petition has been filed against the impugned order of the Vice-Chancellor of the Purvanchal University, Jaunpur, dated 8.11.2001 (Annexure-12 to the petition).

(2.) In our opinion, the petitioner has an alternative remedy of approaching the Chancellor under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act.

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that when an order is passed in violation of the Rules of the natural Justice or if it is wholly without jurisdiction, a writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of an alternative remedy. He has relied on several decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court, e.g., Baburam v. Zila Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 556 ; Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitaram (U.P.) and Ors., 1988 (1) AWC 347 (SC), 1987 UPLBEC 734. etc. In our opinion, these decisions do not lay down any absolute proposition that a writ petition can never be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy if there is violation of natural justice or if the order is without jurisdiction. In our opinion, these decisions only lay down that if the Impugned order is in violation of natural justice or is apparently without jurisdiction, then less weight should be given to the existence of alternative remedy, but that does not mean that in such cases, a writ petition cannot be dismissed at all on the ground of existence of alternative remedy. It all depends on the facts of each case. Writ is a discretionary remedy and the existence of an alternative remedy is certainly an important consideration to be taken into account to decide whether to exercise that discretion or not, vide Union of India v. T.R. Verma, AIR 1957 SC 882, Assistant Collector v. Dunlop India Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 330 and U.P. Jal Nigam v. N.S. Mathur, 1995 (1) SCC 21, etc. Thus, in Assistant Collector v. Dunlop India Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court observed "Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to demand of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question, or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by pass - the alternative remedy provided by statute."