RAMA SHANKAR PANDEY Vs. RAM RAJ

JUDGEMENT

(1.) -This appeal has been preferred against the award given by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chitrakoot. The stamp reporter has reported that the amount as required under the proviso of Section 173 (3) as condition precedent for admission of the appeal, has not been deposited. The deposit is pre-condition for the admission of the appeal.

(2.) I have heard Sri Bharat Ji Agarwal, learned senior advocate assisted by Sri S. D. Singh for the appellant.

(3.) I have considered the decision of all these cases, in which the rights which accrued under the repealed Act have been protected under Section 6 (e) of General Clauses Act and were considered by the Apex Court in various cases. However, none of these case is regarding the rights accrued under the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, after its repeal. There is direct decision of the Apex Court in the case of Motor Vehicles Act which is otherwise. I may refer to the decision of Apex Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, AIR 1991 SC 2156. It was held in this case as under : "Where the accident took place when the old Motor Vehicles Act was in force, however, the claim petition was filed after the repeal of the old Act and the new Act came into force, the case would be covered by the new Act and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned. In such a case, Clause (e) of Section 6 of General Clauses Act is not attracted because, by the enactment of the new law the remedy of the claimant has not been affected at all. His right to claim compensation by filing the claim within the same period of limitation has been preserved. And there was no application for condonation of delay in a proceeding pending at the time of repeal so as to allow him to claim any privilege available under the old Act. Though the claimant earlier could file an application even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation, but this cannot be treated to be a right which the appellant had acquired. The claim to compensation which the claimant was entitled to by reason of the accident was certainly enforceable as a right. It cannot be said in such a case that the present case must be considered as one where an accrued right has been affected, because the option to move an application for condonation of delay belatedly filed should be treated as a right. There is a vital difference between an application claiming compensation and a prayer to condone the delay in filing such an application. Liberty to apply for a right is not in itself an accrued right or privilege. Moreover, claimant's right to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitution of the Act with another. Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the claimant being taken by surprise. So far the question of condonation of six months delay was concerned, there was no change in the position under the new Act."