MOHAMMAD ISLAM Vs. JAGAN LAL ETC.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a second appeal, preferred against the judgment and decree, dated 28-7-2000, passed by the learned Additional Commissioner, Moradabad Division, Moradabad, arising out of the judgment and decree, dated 7-3-2000, passed by the learned trial Court, in a suit under Section 229-B of the UPZA & LR Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

(2.) BRIEF and relevant facts of the case are that the plaintiffs, Jagannath Sharma and others instituted a suit under Section 229-B of the Act for declaring him as bhumidhar, with transferable rights, over the disputed land as detailed at the foot of the plaint. The learned trial Court, by means of its order, dated 7-3-2000 has decreed the aforesaid suit. Aggrieved by this order, an appeal was preferred. During the pendency of this appeal, an application was moved on behalf of the defendant appellant for impleadment of the U.P. State and the Gaon Sabha, concerned, as necessary parties. A written objections was filed on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. The learned lower appellate Court has dismissed the aforesaid application for impleadment, by means of its order, dated 28-7-2000 and also dismissed the first appeal on account of technical defects. Hence this second appeal.

(3.) I have closely and carefully considered the contention raised by the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the relevant records on file. On a bare perusal of the records, it is manifestly clear that the learned lower appellate Court has rightly dismissed the aforesaid application for impleadment as well as the first appeal, as the U.P. State and the Gaon Sabha concerned are necessary parties, in as suit under Section 229-B of the Act. But in first appeal, neither the U.P. State nor the Gaon Sabha, concerned have been impleaded, as parties as respondents, while these two are the necessary parties. The aforesaid first appeal has been admitted on 22-3-2000, while the aforesaid application for impleadment is dated 3-7-2000 and it is not accompanied with an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. The defendant appellant should have moved an application for condonation of delay along with the aforesaid application for impleadment. It is also worthwhile to mention here that in the aforesaid application for impleadment, it has nowhere been mentioned as to under what circumstances, the aforesaid necessary parties have not been impleaded, in the first appeal. The learned lower appellate Court has discussed and considered the relevant and material facts and circumstances of the instant case in correct perspective of law.