(1.) -Heard counsel for the parties. Through this writ petition preferred under Article 226 of Constitution of India the petitioner-detenu has impugned the order dated 16.1.2002 passed by IInd respondent Mr. Hari Ram, District Magistrate, Bahraich, detaining him under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act. The detention order along with grounds of detention which are also dated 16.1.2002 was served on the petitioner detenu on 16.1.2002 itself and their copies have been annexed as Annexures-1 and 2 respectively to the petition.
(2.) SINCE in our view, for the adjudication of pleadings contained in paras 17 and 18 of the petition and ground (g) of para 34 thereof, on which this petition deserves to succeed, it is not necessary to advert to the prejudicial activities of the petitioner-detenu contained in the grounds of detention, we are not adverting to them. The pleading, in sum and substance, as contained in the said paras and ground is that the detaining authority did not communicate to the petitioner detenu, in the grounds of detention, that he had a right to make representation to him within 12 days of the date of issuance of the detention order or its approval by the State Government, whichever was earlier.
(3.) WE may mention that the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra and others v. Santosh Shankar Acharya, 2001 (1) ACrR 453 (SC) : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1400, in a preventive detention under Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (M.P.D.A. Act, 1981), in para 6, has held that till the detention order is approved by the State Government, the detenu will have a right to make a representation to the detaining au-thority and non-communication of this right to the detenu would constitute an infraction of the valuable constitutional right guaranteed to the detenu under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and would make the order of detention invalid. WE feel it pertinent to mention that a perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court shows that it reached this conclusion after examining the provisions contained in Sections 3, 8 and 14 of M.P.D.A. Act. It is pertinent to mention that provisions contained in Sections 3, 8 and 14 of the National Security Act are analogous to those contained in Sections 3, 8 and 14 of the M.P.D.A. Act and in view of the trite what is good for the goose is also good for the gander the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court would apply to the present case.