RAJ KUMARI Vs. MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By means of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioners Raj Kumari and others have challenged the order dated 28.11.1996, Annexure-1 to the writ petition passed by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal/Upper District Judge, 2nd, District Jaunpur, respondent No. 1 in Misc. Case No. 17 of 1996. The petitioners, who were claimants before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jaunpur, which shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the Tribunal' filed a claim petition under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 before the Tribunal and the Tribunal after hearing the parties have given an award awarding a sum of Rs. 2,64,000 in favour of the petitioners-claimants vide its order dated 22.7.1994 in M.A.O. No. 11 of 1987. Thereafter, the owner and driver of the said vehicle, i.e., respondent Nos. 2 and 4, instead of filing an appeal under section 110-D of the Act, filed a restoration application before the Tribunal and the Tribunal after giving full opportunity of hearing to the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 has modified the earlier award dated 22.7.1994 by which the award has been reduced from Rs. 2,64,600 to Rs. 2,04,600 vide its order dated 23.8.1996. Thereafter the owner of the vehicle, the respondent No. 2, filed a review application before the Tribunal and the claimants have filed their objections to the said review application, on which the Tribunal after going through the records accepted the review application and directed that claim to be retried again vide its order dated 28.11.1996. Against this order, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners. This court vide its order dated 21.2.1997 has stayed the further proceedings in claim petition in question.

(2.) I have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners as well as the contesting respondents and also the learned counsel for respondent No. 3, New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Jaunpur. In my opinion, the Tribunal has committed an error of law; firstly when it reduced the earlier award dated 22.7.1994 thereby reducing the amount of compensation from Rs. 2,64,600 to Rs. 2,04,600 vide its order dated 23.8.1996, but that is not under challenge in the present writ petition. Coming to the challenging of the impugned order, Mr. D.S.P. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that in the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal has committed an error in accepting the review application filed by the owner of the vehicle and directed the award to be retried, which is, upon a perusal of the order impugned in the present writ petition, because of discovery of certain evidences coming into existence. The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a Division Bench decision of this court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Bimla Devi, 1999 ACJ 613 (Allahabad), wherein this court relying upon the earlier decision of Apex Court in Harbhajan Singh v. Karan Singh, AIR 1966 SC 641 and the decision of Full Bench of this court in Shivragi v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1997 RD 562, has held that the review application cannot be entertained either under the old Act or under the new Act. The Division Bench further relying upon the two decisions, referred to above, has observed that since there is no specific provision to review or the revision, which is to be created under only statute, the Tribunal has no power to review the same. In this view of the matter, the order impugned in the present writ petition deserves to be quashed.

(3.) Mr. Dinesh Pathak, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 argued firstly, the maintainability of the writ petition instead of filing of an appeal, which has been answered by a Division Bench (supra). Mr. Pathak has further relied upon a decision of learned single Judge of this court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Fida Ali, 1995 ACJ 572 (Allahabad), but in view of the Division Bench decision, I am bound by the decision of the Division Bench. In this view of the matter, the order of Claims Tribunal impugned in the present writ petition dated 28.1.1.1996 is not supported by any law and, therefore, deserves to be quashed.