CHAIRMAN KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITI Vs. LABOUR COURT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ petition is directed against the award of the Labour Court, Allahabad, dated 7.11.1983 by which the Labour Court was pleased to set aside the order terminating the service of Shyam Lal Gupta, who was working as an amin with the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Ajuha, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the 'Mandi Samiti'). He was directed to be reinstated to the post from which he was terminated and be paid uptodate emoluments from the date of order of termination till the date of reinstatement and awarded a cost of Rs. 200/- to be paid to the workman. The Chairman and Secretary of the Mandi Samiti filed this petition being aggrieved by the Judgment and award of the Labour Court seeking its quashing by a writ of certiorari.

(2.) The State Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court to the effect whether the Mandi Samiti was justified in terminating the services of the Respondent No. 2, Shri Gupta. If not, to what relief the Respondent No. 2 would be entitled to. It was pleaded in the written statement by Respondent No. 2, Sri Shyam Lal Gupta, that he was appointed by an order dated 6.12.1972 on the post of amin. His service was suddenly terminated by the order dated 16.3.1980 without any notice or payment of retrenchment compensation to him. It was also pleaded that persons junior to him were retained while his service was terminated. It is admitted that Shri Gupta was appointed as amin on 6.12.1972. However, it is stated that the appointment was purely on temporary basis under the terms of contract which could be terminated with one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof. It was categorically stated in the written statement by the petitioner that the service of Sri Gupta was terminated in accordance with condition No. 6 of the appointment letter. One month's pay in lieu of notice was offered to him which he had refused. Thus, it was stated that the case was not covered under provisions of Section 6(n)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). It was alleged that Shri Gupta was not a workman and reference to the Labour Tribunal was illegal, the provisions of the U.P. Service Tribunal Act was applicable to the case of Sri Gupta, he being a public servant within the meaning of the said Act. The appeal filed by Sri Gupta before the Director of the Mandi Samiti was dismissed, hence the reference made by the State to the Labour Court was not competent. Learned counsel for the petitioner admitted that Sri Gupta was a temporary servant whose service was terminated by simple order of termination causing no stigma against him. There was no motive behind the termination order. At the time of appointment given to respondent Gupta, there was no rules framed by the Mandi Samiti. It was in accordance with the bye-laws of 1983 and condition No. 4 of the bye-laws of the Mandi Samiti which provided one month's notice or one month's salary in lieu thereof. The learned counsel for the petitioner cited Central Co-operative Bank Ltd v. Shibhulal and Ors. AIR 1988 M.P.3. The Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The said case was never referred by the Government of the State under the provisions of the Act. The service of an employee of the Central Co-operative Bank in the said case was terminated by an order simpliciter without any stigma after payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice. Several other submissions were made in that case about the motive in the mind of the employer at the time of issuing the letter of termination. The facts and circumstances of the said case has no relevance to the present case. Another case cited is State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi 1977 (I) LLJ 200. The facts and circumstances of the case referred by the learned counsel has also no relevance to the present case. It also related to an order terminating service of a temporary employee under the terms of contract without any stigma in the order of termination. Thus, in my opinion, this case law does not support the case of the petitioners. The other case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is Oil and Natural Gas Commission and Ors. v. Dr. Mohd. Iskandar Ali 1980(2) LLJ 155. This case law is also not applicable to the case in hand. The controversy in the case cited was about the applicability of provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India to the probationer employee. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to cite any other case law which may be of any assistance in dividing the petitioner's case on the points canvassed by him.

(3.) One copy of the judgment of the Division Bench in writ petition No. 11564 of 1976 was filed as annexure to the writ petition by the petitioner. In the case cited the President of the Krishi Utpadan Samiti, Kurara, Hamirpur had terminated the service of an amin-cum-auctioneer of the said Samiti. In that case also the termination was without stigma on payment of one month's salary in lieu of one month's notice. In the said case, the only point was to the effect that whether the service of a temporary employee could be terminated after payment of one month's salary in place of one month's notice legally and the Division Bench of this Court dismissed the said writ petition on the ground that in pursuance of the condition in the appointment letter, the service could legally be terminated after, paying one month's salary in place of one month's notice. The major emphasis of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the said case also related to a Mandi Samiti and service of an amin was terminated after one month's salary in pursuance of the terms and conditions of the appointment letter and the validity of the said order of termination was upheld by the Division Bench of this Court. It is worthwhile to mention that in the said case also neither there was any reference under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act nor the questions now raised in the present writ petition were ever raised or considered. The subsequent decision of the Supreme Court and our Court have now laid such law which covers the case of the respondent, and the judgment and award of the Labour Court has to be judged in the light of the Judgments of the Supreme Court and case law of our Court. The judgment of the Division Bench of our Court of 1976 (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is, thus, of no assistance.