LAWS(ALL)-1991-2-35

SHYAMBIR Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Decided On February 19, 1991
SHYAMBIR Appellant
V/S
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition is directed as against the order of detention dated 29/08/1990, passed by the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad (Annexure 1 to the present petition) u/S. 3 of the National Security Act. The aforesaid detention order was served on the petitioner in the District Jail Meerut as he was detained in pursuance of earlier FIR dated 1st. of August, 1990. The grounds of detention have been delineated in Annexure-2 to the writ petition. The ground of detention is based on one single incident for which the aforesaid First Information report u/S. 365/307, IPC was lodged as against the petitioner and also on the ground that there is likelihood of the petitioner being released on bail. The version as disclosed in the first information report dated 1-8-90. In short is that on 1st. of August, 1990, one Rakesh who also runs an Electrical shop at Vijai Nagar in the district of Ghaziabad, had reported to respondent No. 1 about the incident in which victim Kuldeep, aged about 14 years, student of Class 8, was kidnapped at 1-30 p.m. when he was returning from his school. He was taken on a Motor Cycle by two unknown persons. Both the accused were initially prevented by many students but since, they fired from their firearms, to terrorise them, they could not catch and ultimately the accused ran away. It has further been submitted in the petition that on the same day of the incident, a police party went in search of the victim namely Kuldeep and co-accused Mukesh Tyagi and on the pointing out of Satendra accused, who had been arrested earlier, victim Kuldeep was recovered and the police party also arrested Mukesh Tyagi, co-accused. It is this incident in the first information report, which is the foundation of order being passed u/S. 3 of the National Security Act.

(2.) The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the said incident is a single incident and secondly, it is not a case of public order. At the most, it may be a case of law and order. On behalf of the respondent, an argument was raised that this Hon'ble Court as well as the Supreme Court time and again have been holding that even one single incident is sufficient to make it a case of public order and thus, merely one incident as is the case in the present petition, would not absolve the petitioner from the legal position. It was further contended that Hon'ble Supreme Court had further approved an order passed under the preventive law where the detaining Authority was satisfied that the detenu was likely to be released on bail and there were every possibilities that the detenue may continue to repeat such offences in case he is released from detention. The contention on behalf of the respondent on the proposition of law is not in doubt. Each case has to be examined on the facts of that case. It is true that if a single incident itself constitutes a case of public order or where there is likelihood of the detenue being released and chances of his recurring the crime which might affect the public at large, it is within the competence of the detaining Authority to pass such order.

(3.) Turning to the facts of the present case, we find that it is a single incident of kidnapping a boy of 14 years from a college by two persons including the petitioner. It has been very elaborately pointed out by the petitioner that initially he had been released on bail but on a desire being expressed, the Magistrate concerned in fact passed an order for identification of the accused in jail and ultimately the petitioner has not been identified in the said identification parade. However, since a regular criminal trial/case is pending, we are not expressing any opinion in the matter, lest it might affect the said trial. However, on the facts of the present case, we find that even though it is alleged that while running away, the two accused persons carrying the boy who is alleged to have been kidnapped, fired in the air, the case on behalf of the respondent is not that while running away, taking the said boy, firing, was made and anybody was injured or killed in the public to create any panick. Thus, merely firing at the public place by itself would not constitute a case of public order. We find that in the present case, there is merely a bald statement made out in the grounds of appeal, which has been recorded by the learned counsel for the state in the counter affidavit/grounds of detention. As we have held that mere bald statement would not be sufficient to hold a case to be of public order, to the similar effect, apart from various authorities, it was also held in Abdul Razzak v. S. N. Sinha, Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad, reported in AIR 1989 SC 2265.