SATYENDRA PAL SINGH Vs. COMMISSIONER KANPUR DIVISION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Petitioner is an elected Pradhan. He was suspended from his office by an order dated 15th March, 1990 passed by the second Respondent, Sub -Divisional Officer, Kannauj, Farrukhabad. This order was confirmed by an order dated 11th March, 1991 passed in revision by the Commissioner, Kanpur Division Kanpur. Still feeling aggrieved, the Petitioner has challenged this order through this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

(2.) HAVING heard Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, I find that there are no merits in this writ petition. The only question which falls for consideration is whether the requirements of Section 95(1)(gg) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (for short "the Act") had been complied with before the order of suspension was made. Sub - -section (1) of Section 95 of the Act through its Clauses (a) to (h) speaks of the action that the State Government may take under certain situations. Under Clause (gg) of the said provisions a Pradhan may be suspended against whom proceedings under Clause (g) are pending or contemplated, or against whom prosecution for an offence which in the opinion of the State Government involves moral turpitude, is pending. Clause (ii) of the last proviso appended to Sub -section (1) of Section 95 says that no action shall be taken under Clause (gg) on the ground that proceedings under Clause (g) are pending or contemplated unless the State Government is prima facie satisfied that the grounds on which action is proposed under that clause exist on a plain reading of the relevant provisions it is evident that suspension pending enquiry or contemplated enquiry, the order made in that behalf is not expected to contain elaborate reasons such as are mandatory and would be necessary where the order is intended to be passed as a measure of punishment under Clause (g) of Sub -section (1) of Section 95 of the Act. The order of suspension under Section 95(1)(gg) would be valid if it is passed on prima facie satisfaction. it is not the requirement of the law that the explanation given by the person suspended be also taken into account and considered at the stage of passing of the suspension order. Thus, what is to be seen, is whether a prima facie satisfaction was recorded before the Petitioner was suspended from his office. The revisional authority has gone into this matter in detail and has returned a clear finding that it has gone through the material on record, on the basis of which a prima facie satisfaction was recorded and it was satisfied that there existed ample material to justify the impugned suspension order.

(3.) IT may however, be observed that the enquiry pending against the Petitioner may be concluded expeditiously and if possible within a period of six months of production of a certified copy of this order before the authority concerned.