PANNA LAL Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revi sion is directed against the order dated 21-1-1981 by Sri V. P, Mathur, Sessions Judge Fatehpur in Criminal appeal No. 199/80 by which the appeal of the revisionist was dis missed and order of conviction and sentence as recorded by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Fatehpur on 1-12-1980 under Section 7/16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentence of 6 months R. I. and a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default, three months R. I. were maintained. Prosecution story briefly stated is that revisionist is a grocer having his shop at G. T. Road in village Tharion district Fatehpur. On 26-3-1979 at about 11. 30 A. M, Sri R. P. Gupta (PW-1), the then Food Inspector Fatehpur inspected the shop of the revisionist and found him exhibiting for sale mustard (Labi) Oil. After disclosing his identity the Food Inspector purchased 7. 50 grams of oil on payment of price vide receipt Ext. Ka-1 duly executed by revisionist which is signed by him and is attested by witness Satya Narain (PW-2 ). Notice form no. 6 (Ext. Ka-2) was served on the revisionist earlier. After compliance of necessary formalities sample phial was sent to Public Analyst, Lucknow who submitted his report dated 25-4-1979 (Ext. Ka-4) by which he found admixture of linseed oil to the extent of about 8%. On receipt of this report necessary sanction for pro secution from Chief Medical Officer Sri P. L. Rathi (Ext. Ka-6), as pro/ed by PW-3, was procured and the revi sionist was informed through regis tered post to avail his right under Section 13 (2) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act about comparison of the sample by Director, Central Food Laboratory, if he so desired. The revisionist was sent up to stand his trial; prosecution examined Sri R. B. Gupta. Food Inspector to support the prosecution version as P. W. 1 and Sri Satya Narain as P. W. 2 and formal witness Ram Kishan (P. W. 3) to prove the sig natures of Chief Medical Officer and produced the register showing des patch of the letter to the revisionist through registered post to satisfy the requirements of Section 13 (2) aforesaid. In his statement revisionist alleged that he had been involved falsely on account of ill-will oil was of Satya Narain who was keeping it at his shop and during his absence the Food Inspector forcibly seized the sample. His signatures were fraudulently procured. In defence one Chedi Lal (DW-1) was examined to support the defence. The learned trial Magistrate recorded conviction and sentence aforesaid giving rise to appeal No. 199/80 which failed. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The simple point pressed before me in this revision was about the non-compliance of Section 13 (2) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, which reads as below. "on receipt of the report of the result of the analysis under sub-section (1) to the effect that the article of food is adulterated the Local (Health) Authority shall, after the institution of pro secution against the person from whom the sample of the article of food was taken and the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been dis closed under Section 14-A, for ward in such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the report of the result of the analysis to such person or persons at the case may be informing such per son or persons that if it is so desired, either or both of them may make an application to the Court within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample of the articles of food kept by the local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. " So, the contention was that this provision is peremptory and its non-compliance was fatal to the case. On behalf of State it was pointed out that there was opinion of learned appellate Court under Section 73 of Indian Evidence Act that the writing on acknowledgment receipt paper No. 13-A/l (Ext. Ka-9) was in the hand of the revisionist. This writing is as below. "panna Lal Vaste Ram Raj". Thus, the question is about the authenticity of this writing. If this writing is not of revisionist, then his contention that he did not receive any letter informing him about the right to be availed under Section 13 (2) of the aforesaid Act has been denied to him. In this connection I may refer to the statement of the revisionist himself as recorded on 26-1-1980. In reply to question No. 6, he denied to have received any letter along with the report of Public Analyst showing the sample adul terated. Sri R. B. Gupta, Food Inspector (PW-1) who is the main witness relied upon by the prosecu tion and who had absolutely no occasion to espouse the cause of revi sionist and damage the prosecution story irretrievably, stated in cross-examination that the report of Public Analyst was not sent to the revisionist in his presence; when he was shown acknowledgment due Ext. Ka-9, he made a categorical statement that it did not bear the signatures of revi sionist Panua Lal. There is absolutely no other evidence on record to show that Ext. Ka-9 bears signatures of Panna Lal. Under these circumstances, the question arises whether in the teeth of denial by revisionist and Food Inspector, it was open to the learned Appellate Judge to treat Ext. Ka-9 as evidence to hold that revisionist was supplied the copy of the report of Public Analyst vide Ext. Ka-9. On behalf of revisionist reli ance was placed upon Nagappa v. Nani Bul A. I. R. 1960 Mys. 221 para. 5 and 6, in which it was ob served that the Court, although empowered to compare the disputed signatures with admittedly genuine signatures under Section 73 of Indian Evidence Act, the rule of prudence requires that comparison of signa tures by Courts as a mode of ascer taining truth should be used with great care and caution. In Har Deo Mai v. State A. I. R. 1969 Alld. 431 para. 31, it was pointed out that it was not open to exercise power of comparison under Section 73 of Indian Evidence Act to the Court at re visional stage. There was no ques tion of bringing any additional material by way of evidence at the stage of revision. On behalf of State reliance was placed upon Smt. Sundari Devi and others v. Ganga Ram and others 1979 A LJ. 38, where it was pointed out that the Court cannot blindly accept a report of the expert under Section 45 of Indian Evidence Act. It is the duty of an expert to furnish the judge necessary criteria for testing the accuracy of his conclusion so as to enable the Judge to form his in dependent judgment by application of criteria to the facts proved in evidence. It does not provide that the Judge at the revisional Stage or appellate stage can base himself on such opinion without any evidence on record. A mere look at the scheme of Indian Evidence Act shall go to dis close that opinions are relevant under Sections 45 to 51 of Indian Evidence Act; Section 73 which occurs under the Chapter 'admissibility' details about the mode of proof and not about relevancy. Cases are to be decided on evidence. Evidence may be oral or documentary. It has been shown above that there is absolutely no evidence on record to prove Ext. Ka-9 to have been signed by the revisionist. The revisionist did not admit the same. It is correct that Section 73 deals with mode of proof of documents. Those modes are well recognised. In the first place, this can be done by getting an admission from the opposite party. Under Section 58, facts admitted need not be proved. Secondly, the person who himself wrote the document can be called as a witness and he can give direct evi dence under Section 60. Thirdly, the person who was present when the document was written or signed can depose under Section 60 as to the identity of the signature or the hand writing. Fourthly, an expert can be examined to establish the identity of the hand-writing or signature by comparison of the disputed document with an undisputed or a sample docu ment (Section 45 ). In the fifth place, the signature or hand-writing can also be proved by the evidence of person acquainted with the hand writing under Section 47, or it can be proved under Section 67. Lastly, the Court itself can compare the hand-writing in the disputed and undisputed documents and satisfy it self as to the identity (Section 73), but such opinion of the Court cannot be a substitute for the evidence as the Court shall not enter the witness box to testify about the accuracy of his opinion which way be subjected to cross-examination. The Courts do not ordinarily base their decision even on an expert evidence only un less it is supported by other evidence, external and internal. It was observed by S. A. de Smith in his Judicial Review of Administra tive Action at page II3". Tribu nals may use their technical and local knowledge and accumulated exprertise to draw inferences from evidence. A tribunal that is required to act on evidence cannot use its own expert opinion as a substitute for evidence Meson v. Minister of Pen sions 1945 K. B. 490, but it is generally entitled to use its expertise and knowledge of local conditions to supplement evidence R. v. Howard (1902) 2 K. B. 363 at 376. If it is possible to state any general proposition, it is that the Courts will more readily require disclosure of evidence obtained from indepen dent sources than from the know ledge of members of the tribunal R. v. West minister (City of) Assess ment Committee (1941) 1 K. B. 53 at 62, 69. Thus, it is a case of total absence of evidence about authenticity of signatures on Ext. Ka-9, being in the hand of revisionist. So the afore said finding by the learned appellate Court is unsustainable and the revi sion is to be allowed for the simple reason that Section 13 (2) of Preven tion of Food Adulteration Act, which is mandatory, has not been complied within this case. No other point was argued before me. The revision is allowed. The impugned order is set asidu: revi sionist is acquitted of the charge under Section 7/16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The revi sionist is on bail; he need not surrender to his bail bonds, which are discharged. Fine, if deposited by the revisionist, shall be refunded to him. .