(1.) This is plaintiff's second appeal arising out of a suit filed for declaration that the appellant was permanent principal of the college since its upgrading on 1-7-1965 and a permanent injunction restraining the Managing Committee from interfering in discharge of his duties as Principal. It was also prayed that the selection for the post of principal held on 8-6-1967, the recommendation of Selection Committee dated 8-6-1967 and the approval given by Deputy Director Education (hereinafter referred to as D. D. E.) on 29-8-1967 may be declared illegal and void. In 1957 appellant was appointed as Head Master of the Junior High School. Within one year the School was upgraded as High School and with it the appellant was also promoted as Principal. On 1-7-1965 it was upgraded again as Intermedite College. May be due to appellant's efforts. On 14-8-1965 the Manager of the College wrote a letter to D. D. E. to promote the appellant as Principal as he was qualified. The correspondence went on till 1967 when the Managing Committee with approval of D. D. E. advertised the post for appoimmei. t by selection instead of promotion. The selection was held on 3-6- 1967 in which the appellant also appeared but unfortunately was not selected. The trial Court decreed the suit but the older was set aside in appeal. The appellate Court held that appellant had no vested right to be promoted as Principal when the college was upgraded. Nor was he ever approved for appointment as Pnnicipal by D. D. E. It is the legality of these findings which have been challenged by the learned counsel for appellant. Proviso to Regulation 16 of Chapter III reads as under: "that when an institution is raised from High School to Intermediate the post of Principal shall be filled by promotion of Head Master if he is qualified, possessed good record of service and is approved, in the manner prescribed in the Act. " For the purpose of this appeal it may be assumed that appellant was duly qualified and possessed a good record of service although finding by lower appellate Court is otherwise. Even then the plaintiff could succeed only if his promotion was approved in the manner prescribed in the Act. According to learned counsel the only manner provided in the Act is in Section 16-F and as that cannot apply to the case of promotee it should be assumed that promotion of the plaintiff was as a matter of right and it was not necessary that his name should have been recommended and approved by the D. D. E. The argument does not appear to be convincing. The words 'in the manner prescribed in the Act' have to be read in the manner so as to be consistent with the Act and rules framed thereunder. Section 16-F of U. P. Intermediate Education Act provides that if a teacher or a principal is appointed, his appointment shall be approved by the District Inspector of Schools or Deputy Director of Education as the case may be The approval is accorded on the recommendation of selection committee. For cases of promotion it is obvious that there is no selection committee and the name has to be recommended by Managing Committee. Therefore, in case of promotee instead of selection committee it is the Managing Committee which has to be read. In any case by omission of mentioning the word 'managing committee' it cannot be held that the plaintiff was entitled to be promoted as a matter of right without recommendation and approval. After the college was upgraded the Managing Committee sent a letter on 14-8-1965 to the D. D E. that as the plaintiff was working as Principal and he was qualified his appointment as Principal may be approved in accordance with the Intermediate Education Act. On 27-8 1965 the D. D. E. replied the letter that if the plaintiff possessed the requisite qualifications he shall have no objection and the papers in connection with approval may be submitted. The Managing Committee sent reminder to the D. D. E. on 23-5-1966 and 13-6-1966. A request was made that the matter of promotion as Principal may be- finalised on 17-6-11 66. The DDE sent the reply that although the plaintiff was shown as a permanent Principal in the recoid but no document was available to show that his appointment as Head Master was ever approved by the District Inspector of Schools He, therefore, directed the Managing Committee to remove these irregularities, and thereafter submit the papers for approval of appellant's promotion as Principal. It appears there after the matter did not proceed happily for the appellant and for some reason the Managing Committee fell back on its original letter and wrote and sent letters to the D. D E. that services of the "plaintiff were not satisfactory and they wanted to appoint a Principal by selection. The Deputy Director agreed with it and informed the Managing Committee that if services of the appellant were not satisfactory the Committee could go ahead with the appointment as provided in the Act. As a matter of fact these conespomience and the sub-sequent attitude of the Managing Committee has caused grievance to the plamtiff but that cannot be a ground for granting a declaration to the plaintiff as he can succeed only if it is established from record that his appointment as Principal was ever approved by the Deputy Director. Learned counsel for appellant vehemently argued that letter tent by Deputy Director on 17-6-1966 amounted to implied approval of appellant's promotion as Principal. This, however, js not possible to accept. It was only a letter in reply to the letter sent by the Managing Committee to remove irregularities and submit the proposal for promotion. This cannot be interpreted as a letter approving the promotion of appellant as Principal. The lower appellate Court further appears to be right in observing that the appellant having appeared in the interview neld by the College for appoint ment as Principal is not entitled to seek a declaration that the selection held by the Committee was illegal or void. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed. The appellant is going to retire in this month. It would not be expedient to saddle him with costs. It is, therefore directed that parties shall bear their own costs in this Court and in the Courts below as well. .