LAL JI SINGH Vs. SHIV PUJAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is arising out of the proceeding under Section 20 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in the matter of allotment of Chak.

(2.) THE petitioners had filed objection under Section 20 of the Act against the opposite parties about the Chaks which were allotted to them against their original holdings. THE Consolidation Officer vide order dated 25-2-1971 dismissed the objection. Aggrieved by it, the petitioners had filed appeal which was partly allowed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) vide order dated 23-3-1972. THEreupon the petitioners filed two revisions which were registered as Revision No. 1391 and 2020 of 1972. Shiva Pujan, opposite party No. 1 has also filed Revision No. 1290. On 1-7-1975 the parties entered into a compromise and on the basis of this compromise the Deputy Director of Consolidation vide order dated 2-7-1975 had allowed the revisions and had directed the amendments to be made in the respective chaks of the parties. This order of the Dupty Director of Consolidation dated 2-7-1975 is contained in annexure 3 to the writ petition. Since Sarju Singh' opposite party No. 4 had not signed the said compromise, he moved an application for setting aside the aforesaid order dated 2-7-1975. THE Deputy Director of Consolidation vide order dated 31-8-1979 recalled the aforesaid order and after hearing the parties on merits, he allowed Revision No. 1290 filed by Sheo Pujan vide order dated 23-2-1980 and rejected the revisions filed by the petitioners. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioners filed this writ petition.

(3.) BY order dated 31-8-1979, the Deputy Director of Consolidation had set aside the order dated 2-7-1975, which was passed in terms of compromise. The compromise itself was not set aside. In Shadi Ram v. Amin Chand, AIR 1930 Lahore 937, it was held by the Lahore High Court that a compromise which has merged in a decree does not become extinct upon the decree being set aside. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that where a decree or order based on compromise is set aside but the genuineness of the compromise itself has not been doubted in any manner, whatsoever, nor it has been set aside being invalid or fraudulently obtained, the compromise would continue to have the legal force and binding effect on the parties thereto. It can be referred to and relied upon in that very suit or proceedings and also in other proceedings as well, for the purpose of showing the terms contained therein, to which the parties had agreed with open eyes and settled to be bound by it. It can also be referred and relied upon as a valid piece of evidence containing admissions of parties thereto on relevant facts contained therein. It would, of course be open to parties to urge and establish the circumstances, dubious in nature, in which it was obtained, so as to indicate that it was not at all genuine and was fraudulently obtained. It can also be shown that the facts contained therein are erroneous and untrue or that the parties never intended to be bound by it or that it is opposed to law.