(1.) THE only point raised before me was that the view taken by the lower appellate court that the suit was barred by Section 6 of the U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976, was not correctly decided. THE contention of the learned counsel was that the appellant is a workman, and, therefore, the bar imposed by the U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 to the institution of a suit by him, did not apply, because by clause (e) of sub-section (4) of Section 1, the applicability of the Act was generally excluded in the case of a workman, as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
(2.) IN the face of the language of the provisions referred to above, it is impossible to uphold the contention of the learned counsel. Sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976, provides that "this Section and Sections 2 and 6 shall apply in relation to all public servants while the remaining provisions shall not apply to the following of public servants, namely :- (a),...........(b)............(c).............(d)............ (e) a workman as defined in the INdustrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), or the United Provinces INdustrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U. P. Act XXVIII of 1947)."
(3.) THE learned counsel for THE appellant, however, referred to THE observations of THE Supreme Court in The Premier Automobile Ltd. v. K. S. Wadke, AIR 1975 SC 2238, para 11, at page 2245. That case has no application to THE facts of THE present case and THE particular observations relied upon by THE learned counsel are not relevant for determining THE effect of Section 6 read with sub-section (1) of THE U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976.