UDAIVEER SINGH Vs. D M FARRUKHABAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner held a licence for SBBL gun. A notice dated 20-7-1972 was served on him to show cause why his licence may not be cancelled on the ground that he was involved in proceedings under Section 107/ 117 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is true that such proceedings were commenced against the petitioner but the most important fact to be noticed is that the parties to that case entered into a compromise and in pursuance thereof the proceedings were dropped by an order dated 3-2-1973 filed as Annexure 4 to the writ petition. The order was passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate concerned. He recorded a categorical finding -- "I am satisfied that there is no apprehension of breach of peace. The notice against the opposite parties is withdrawn and they are let off." Still, however, the District Magistrate by his order dated 17-9-1973 cancelled the licence of the petitioner. The petitioner filed an appeal on 17-12-1973 which was dismissed by the appellate authority, namely, the Commissioner. Allahabad Division on 1-6-1974. The petitioner has challenged the orders passed by the District Magistrate as well as the Commissioner. As far as the appellate order is concerned it proceeds on two grounds. Firstly, it says that the appeal had been field beyond the period of limitation and was therefore liable to be dismissed on that preliminary ground. Secondly, it also deals with the merits of the case and reiects the appeal on merits.

(2.) We have heard the counsel of the petitioner as also the Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondents. We find ourselves unable to sustain the impugned appellate order on any of the grounds stated therein. It has been clearly averred in the writ petition, and this material assertion has not been controverted in the counter-affidavit, that the order of the District Magistrate was issued by the office of the District Magistrate on 17-11-1973 and it was communicated to the petitioner on the same date. Thereafter he applied for a certified copy of the order on 19-11-1973 and the copy was ready according to the allegations in the counter-affidavit on 21-11-1973 but the petitioner took delivery of the same on 30-11-1973. In order to answer the first question, namely whether the petitioner's appeal was barred by limitation it is necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 18 of the Arms Act, 1959. which in so far as relevant for the purpose of this case reads:-

(3.) There are two striking features of the above provisions which must be taken into account in deciding whether the appeal preferred by the petitioner could be dismissed on the ground of limitation. Sub-section (3) of Section 18 makes the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act applicable with respect to the computation of period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal under the Arms Act. From this it follows that the provisions of Section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act would also be attracted and the time requisite for obtaining a certified copy of the order must be excluded for the purpose of computing the limitation. Besides, the rigour of limitation prescribed for preferring an appeal under the Arms Act has been whittled down by the Legislature by inserting Sub-section (2) in Section 18. It permits an appeal being admitted even after the expiry of the period prescribed therefor, provided the appellant satisfies the appellate authority that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period.