STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Vs. VIKRAM NATH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition arises out of proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The facts, in brief, are these. The opposite party No. 1, Vikram Nath who is a minor under the guardianship of his father Sri Devendra Nath owns immovable properties in the urban area of Allahabad. He applied for permission to sell property No. 49. Balrampur House, Allahabad in favour of Srimati Savitri Devi and Srimati Dulari Devi. This permission was refused by the competent authority but on appeal the appellate authority set aside the judgment of the competent authority and granted the permission. Feeling aggrieved, the State of Uttar Pradesh has now come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard the learned Standing Counsel and in opposition, Sri K. G. Srivastava, learned counsel for opposite party No. 1 has made his submissions. The learned Standing Counsel contended that in the instant case Section 5 (3) was a bar to the grant of permission under Section 27. In my view, there is no reason to interfere in the appellate authority's judgment because if the permission was needed, it has been granted by the appellate authority and if on the authority of the Supreme Court, in Bhim Singh Ji's case A. I. R. 1981 S. C, 234 no permission was needed, then also the sale deed by opposite party No. 1 would be a valid one. It should be seen that the total area of the land with buildings thereon owned by opposite party No. 1 is 1,936. 44 Sq. metres. It is admitted that 986. 82 Sq. metres is covered area and, therefore, vacant land in the instant case is less than 1,500 Sq. metres, which is the ceiling of vacant land in the Allahabad Urban Agglomar-ation. The competent authority in his order refused to treat covered area as vacant land on the ground that under Section 2 (q) (ii) the opposite party No. 1 had not proved that the building in question had been constructed after obtaining the approval of the proper authority. Sri A. G. Srivastava, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1 contended that the interpretation which the competent authority placed on Section 2 (q) (ii) was not correct. His point is that the clause which speaks of approval of the appropriate authority under Section 2 (q) (ii) refers only to such buildings which were being constructed on the appointed day and not to those buildings which had already been completed before the appointed day. The learned Standing Counsel submitted that this interpretation was not sustainable and that approval of the appropriate authority was needed in respect of buildings irrespective of whether they had been constructed prior to the appointed day or were under construction on the appointed day. The point is not free from difficulty and no case-law has been placed before me which would throw light on this controversy. However, I feel that in a situation of this kind, I should not express any crystallised opinion regarding the correct interpretation of the said clause. In such circumstances, I feel that it would not be correct to interfere with the decision of the appellate authority because at this stage, it cannot be said that any mistake was committed by the said authority which may be said to be apparent on the face of the record. In this view of the matter, this petition is liable to be dismissed and I dismiss it accordingly without making any order as to costs. I make it clear that the opposite party No. 1 will be entitled to execute the sale-deed for which permission was sought without going into the question whether such permission was really needed or not. If the permission was needed it has been accorded by the appellate authority below whose decision stands since I am not interfereing with the same. In case, no permission is needed in view of the aforesaid Suprme Court pronouncement, then obviously there is no difficulty in the way of the opposite party No. 1 executing the sale deed. I have been impelled to make this observation because it has been stated from the Bar that unnecessary complications are being created by the registration authorities in registering transfer-deeds even where no permission is needed under Section 27 (1) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid pronouncement. .