VIJAI GOPAL Vs. NANAK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) One Sushil Kumar met with an accident which took place on 7. 8. 1972. As a result of that accident he expired. He left behind one minor son Vijai Gopal and his widow Smt, Jarawati Devi. She was pregnant at that time and a few months after the accident she gave birth to a daughter Smt. Purnima. The two minors through their mother as their next friend made an application for compensation under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act which was received by the Claims Tribunal on 15. 9. 1973. Since there had been a delay of about 13 months in the making of the claim, the Claims Tribunal took the view that it was barred by time and could not be entertained. The benefit of Section 6 of the Limitation Act was not given to the applicants as in the opinion of the Claims Tribunal that section was not attracted. Aggrieved the claimants have filed the present appeal. It has been submitted before us on behalf of the appellants by their counsel Sri Jagdish Prasad that the view taken by the Claims Tribunal is erroneous in law and that the benefit of Sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act should have been given to the appellants. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Limitation Act which is relevant for the present purpose, reads- "6. (1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefore in the third column of the Schedule. " For the present purpose it is not necessary to refer to other sub-sections of this Section. Section 7 of the Limitation Act may also be read. The relevant portion reads- "7, Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but, where no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased. " There are two explanations to this Section. It is, however, not necessary to reproduce the same. Under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act an application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of Section 110-A may be made, where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. Under Sub-section (3) the period within which such an application can be made is within six months of the occurrence of the accident. The proviso to the sub-section says- "provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. " The question which fails for consideration is as to whether when one of the legal representatives of the deceased was minor and the other had been conceived and was born a few months after, can they be allowed benefit con ferred under sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Limitation Act and in the same connection another question which arises is as to whether the widow of the deceased could have given a valid discharge without the concurrence of the other two legal representatives one of whom was a minor and the other had been conceived. So far as the latter aspect is concerned, it is evident that answer to this question can only be given in the negative because a minor is not competent to give his consent. The other child also who came in this world a few months after the accident, could not have given her consent. In other words, the widow of the deceased could not have given a valid discharge as contemplated under Section 7 of the Limitation Act. Now both these minors suffered from a disability and it was valid consideration while entertaining their application after the expiry of the said period of six months. We find support for the view which we have taken, from several decisions to which our attention has been invited by the learned counsel for the appellants. In Pritpal Singh and others v. New Suraj Trans port Co. (P) Ltd. and others 1974 A. C. J. 277. some of the claimants were minors and one of the pleas taken in defence was that the claim petition had been presented after the expiry of the statutory period and the benefit of Section 6 of the Limitation Act could not be extended to a claim made under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. This contention was repelled by the Punjab and Haryana High Court and it was held that Section 6 of the Limitation Act applied not only to the suit under the Code of Civil Procedure but also to the similar proceedings under other enactments. It was further held that the minors' claim could not be dismissed on the ground that the claim of major applicant was time barred. There is a decision of Delhi High Court in Bishan Doss v. Ramesh and others. 1971 A. C. J. 203. In that case a person had died in an accident leaving behind a widow and two minor children. The children filed an application for com pensation under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act after the expiry of the period of limitation. They claimed extension of time on the ground that they were minors. It was held that each of the minors had a separate cause of action and each one of them was entitled to separate compensation by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was not a joint claim and the mother was not competent to give a valid discharge in respect of the compensation payable to the minor children, On this view the provisions of Section 7 of the Limitation Act were held not applicable and the application for compensation was treated as within time. Lastly, there is a decision of a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court. In Amalgamated Coal Fields Ltd. v. Mst. Chhoti Bai and others 1973 A. C. J. 365, a suit for damages claimed as a result of an accident was fifed after the expiry of one year from the date of death. However, on the date of the suit all the five claimants being daughters of the deceased were minors. The benefit of Section 7 was given and it was held that the widow could not, under the Hindu Law, give a discharge in her own right in respect of the rights of her minor daughters and, thus, the second part of Section 7 of the Limitation Act was attracted and the limitation stood extended in favour of the plaintiffs who had a joint right to sue. We are in respectful agreement with those decisions. Thus, the view taken by the Claims Tribunal in holding that the application for compensation was beyond time, is erroneous. That application was within time and the case should now be decided on merits. The appeal is hence allowed and the order of the Claims Tribunal dated 11. 7. 1975 is set aside. The case is remanded to the Claims Tribunal for decision on merits. We make no order as to costs. .