OM PRAKASH SINGHAL Vs. SHEELA BHATIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) ONE Sri Sant Ram Bhatia was landlord of an accommodation of which the petitioner is the tenant. Sri Sant Ram Bhatia filed a suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent and damages against the petitioner in the court of Small Causes at Kanpur. During the pendency of the litigation Sri Sant Ram Bhatia died and is now represented by his legal representatives, respondents 1 to 8. The case of Sri Sant Ram Bhatia was that the accommodation in question was constructed in the year 1964 and consequently neither U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947) nor U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972) applied to the said accommodation. The defence of the petitioner, however, was that the said accommodation had been constructed in the year 1962 and consequently U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 became applicable to it in the year 1972. His further case was that he had deposited a sum of Rs. 240/- on 6th July, 1973 under Section 30 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and another sum of Rs. 1140/- on 13th February, 1975 under the same section. According to him, if these deposits were taken into account, he was not in arrears of any rent when the suit was instituted. The petitioner further deposited a sum of Rs. 1432/- on 17th September, 1975 purporting to be in compliance of Section 39 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and after making the said deposit he claimed immunity from a decree for eviction being passed against him. At this place it may be pointed out that Sri Sant Ram Bhatia had already given credit to the sum of Rs. 240/- deposited by the petitioner under Section 30 on 6th of July, 1973 and there was no dispute in regard to that amount. The deposit which was made on 17th September, 1975 by the petitioner under Section 39 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 had been made after adjusting the sum of Rs. 1140/- deposited by him on 13th February, 1975 under Section 30 aforesaid. On the question as to when the accommodation in dispute was constructed, the Judge Small Cause Court accepted the plea raised by the landlord and held that the said accommodation had been constructed on 1st October, 1964 within the meaning of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. On this finding, he held that U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 was not applicable to the accommodation in question prior to 1st October, 1974. He further seems to have taken the view that since the suit was filed in the year 1973, the petitioner was not entitled to adjust the sum of Rs. 1140/- deposited on 13th February, 1975. Even though it has not been so stated in his order, it appears that the Judge Small Cause Court was of the view that benefit of Sec. 39 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 could be given to the petitioner only if he had deposited the sum of Rs, 1140/- also on 17th September, 1975 along with the sum of Rs. 1432/-deposited by him. On this finding the suit both for recovery of arrears of rent as well as mesne profits and for ejectment of the petitioner from the accommodation in question was decreed. A revision was filed by the petitioner before the District Judge which was dismissed by the Illrd Additional District Judge, Kanpur on 2nd November, 1976. It is these two orders which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition.

(2.) BEFORE dealing with the respective submissions made by the counsel for the parties, it may be pointed out that the petitioner had earlier preferred a civil revision in this Court against the order of the Illrd Additional District Judge dated 2nd November, 1976, which I am informed by the counsel for the petitioner, has after the institution of the writ petition been dismissed on the ground that It was not maintainable.

(3.) AT this stage, it may also be pointed out that as found by the Additional District Judge, the summons of the suit were served on the petitioner on 26th August, 1975 and the deposit made under Section 39 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 on 17th September, 1975 was apparently within 30 days of the knowledge of the suit as contemplated by this section. Nothing has been brought to my notice which may indicate that the petitioner had knowledge of the suit at any time earlier.