(1.) Applicant Kali Charan has been convicted under Sec. 7/16 Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced to six months' R.I. and a fine of Rs. 1000.00 in default further R.I. for three months.
(2.) The case against the revisionist was that he was found manufacturing ice-candy without license during an inspection at 11.00 A.M. on 22-5-76 by the Food Inspector. Secondly that amongst the ingredients used for preparing ice-candy a tin of adulterant banana green a non-edible green pigment was found in the factory. There was a third count about violation of R.I. 42(d) but the revisionist has been exonerated of that charge and it is no longer in point. The revisionist's case was that the factory belonged to one Jai Prakash who was prosecuted as a co-accused. Jai Prakash asserted that he was not the owner that it belonged to another Jai Prakash and he was only a financier. The trial court acquitted Jai Prakash holding that his ownership of the factory had not been proved, but convicted the revisionist on the two counts of keeping an adulterant and manufacturing without license. The lower appellate court gave the revisionist the benefit of doubt under charge of breach of R.I. 50 holding that the Food Inspector having admitted that he was only a servant, he should not definitely be held to be manufacturer. None the less It maintained the conviction for storing the adulterant.
(3.) Keeping of an adulterant in the premises is punishable under Sec. 16(l)(d) which prescribed for the punishment of a person "being a manufacturer of an article of food he has in his possession or in any premises occupied by him any material which may be implied for the purpose of adulterant". It would thus appear that only the manufacturer can be penalised under this provision and not an employee of the manufacturer. Seen in this light the judgment of the lower appellate court appears to suffer from an inconsistency. Whereas the revisionist was given the benefit of doubt about running the ice candy factory on the ground of not being a manufacturer he was convicted and punished for storing the non-edible dye which may be used for adulteration ignoring the fact that it is only the manufacturer who can be punished for this act. The lower appellate court has held that the manufacturer character of the revisionist is not proved beyond doubt with which finding concur. I would hold that on this view the revisionist's conviction under Sec. 16 for possession of the adulterant also cannot be sustained.