INDU TEWARI Vs. RAM BAHADUR CHAUDHARI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act filed by smt. Indu Tewari, hereinafter called the petitioner. The facts giving rise to the petition can briefly be stated as under: The petitioner purchased a motor vehicle No. U. P. Z. 9529 in the name of her nephew Saroj Kumar, The petitioner wanted to ply the motor vehicle as a public carrier and applied for a permit for the same in respect of Etawah-Bhind route in the name of Ram Bahadur Chaudhary, opposite party as he already possessed a driving licence in his name. With that end in view she also sot the name of the opposite party entered in the relevant papers as registered owner. Thereafter some differences cropped up between the parties. It is not necessary to mention in detail the facts relating to those differences. It should suffice to state that in the year 1979 the petitioner filed a suit in the court of the Civil Judge Etawah for injunction to restrain the opposite party from interfering in the petitioner's ownership and possession of the disputed vehicle. This suit was decreed ex parte on 17th July, 1979. The opposite party filed an appeal against the ex parte decree in this Court and also moved an application for injunction. The opposite party, however, failed to get any stay and the first appeal filed by him is still pending. The petitioner's grievance is that in spite of the decree passed in the civil suit, the opposite party has been plying the bus on permit No. 1028 and he is, therefore, guilty of contempt. The opposite party has entered appearance and opposed the petition,

(2.) The first question that falls for consideration in the instant case is whether, in view of the fact that the petitioner had an effective alternative remedy of enforcing the decree passed in the civil suit by putting it in execution under Order XXI, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it would be a fit case in which this court should exercise its jurisdiction under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act.

(3.) It is well settled that the matter of contempt is always an issue between the court and the contemner. No right vests in a private party to get any person punished for contempt. He can only inform the Court of the contempt committed by any person and thereafter it is for the Court to deal with the contemner. The party which informs the Court about the alleged contempt can only assist the Court in coming to the conclusion whether any contempt has been committed or not. As opposed to this, if a person obtains an interim injunction or a final decree for injunction, he gets a right to enforce it. The provision for enforcement of an interim injunction is contained in Order XXXIX Rule 2-A, Civil P. C. and the provision for enforcement of a decree for injunction is contained in Order XXI, Rule 32, Civil P. C. According to the said provision, a person who disobeys an injunction order can be put into prison and his property can also be attached. The attachment can continue for one year and if the party against whom the order or decree is passed refused to comply, the property can even be sold. The orders passed in proceedings under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A as well as the orders passed in execution proceedings under Order XXI, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure are appealable orders. Further the proceedings under Order XXXIX. Rule 2-A as well as execution proceedings under Order XXI, Rule 32 are elaborate proceedings in which the parties can adduce their evidence and they can examine and cross-examine the witnesses. As opposed to this, the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act are of summary nature. In my opinion, a person who has got an effective alternative remedy of the nature specified under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A or under Order XXI. Rule 32, Civil P. C. should not be permitted to skip over that remedy and take resort to initiate proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. The least that can be said is that it would not be a proper exercise of discretion on the part of this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act when such an effective and alternative remedy is available to any person. I am fortified in taking this view by the observations made in Ram Rup Pandey v. R. K. Bhargava, (AIR 1971 All 231) and Calcutta Medical Stores v. Stadmed Private Ltd., ((1977) 81 Cal WN 209). Relying on these two decisions I myself took the same view recently in Abdul Sattar v. Hira Lal (Civil Misc. Contempt Case No. 96 of 1979 decided on 20-2-1981).