LAWS(ALL)-1971-3-36

RAJIENDRA NATH SHUKLA Vs. SHIVA NATH SHUKLA

Decided On March 04, 1971
RAJIENDRA NATH SHUKLA Appellant
V/S
SHIVA NATH SHUKLA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE are two con nected appeals and have been filed byRajendra Nath Shukla in the following circumstances:-

(2.) SHIVA Nath Shukla respondent had filed a suit (No. 333 of 1959) in the Court of Munsif South, Lucknow for can cellation of a gift deed which was execut ed by Smt. Gomti Devi, widow of Hardeo Prasad, dated 28th September, 1968 in favour of Rajendra Nath in respect of one-half share in the disputed house on the ground that under the Hindu Law Smt. Gomti Devi inherited only the in terest of her husband and under the Hindu Law a coparcener could not ali enate his share in the joint family pro perty by gift and the disputed property be ing joint Hindu property Smt. Gomti Devi also could not make a valid gift of that property. The contesting defendant deni ed that Smt. Gomti Devi was a coparcener and maintained that she had acquired an absolute right of ownership in the pro perty under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in respect of pro perty inherited by her from her deceased husband. The trial Court held that the gift deed was invalid and decreed the suit for cancellation. Meanwhile, Rajendra Nath had filed a suit (No. 447 of 1959) be fore the same Munsif for partition of the joint family property claiming one-half share in the disputed house on the basis of the gift deed executed by Smt. Gomti Devi in his favour and some other pro perty. In that case the defence was that Rajendra Nath Shukla possessed only 1/21st share in the house because Smt. Gomti Devi could not make a valid gift of copar-cenery property. On the basis of the find ings in suit No. 333 of 1959 the Munsif held that Rajendra Nath Shukla had 5/9th share in the house and awarded a decree passed by the Munsif in suit No. 333 of 1959. An appeal was filed by Rajendra Nath Shukla. In appeal the Munsif's find ing that Smt. Gomti Devi had a right to execute a valid gift deed in respect of her share was upheld, but for other reasons which it is no longer relevant to state the case was remanded to the lower court for findings on some issues which had not been framed. On remand the two suits were consolidated and tried together by the Munsif and the suit for partition was decreed for 5/9th share only in the dis puted house. Both parties, went up in appeal before the Civil Judge and this time it was heard by the Additional Civil Judge who held that Smt. Gomti Devi was not legally competent to execute the gift deed and a decree for cancellation of the same was awarded. The decree in the partition suit was modified in the light of the above finding. It is in these circum stances that the two connected appeals come before this Court.

(3.) IT is, therefore, clear that Smt. Gomti Devi became full and absolute owner of the interest which was acquired by her in the disputed property under Section 3 (2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act on the death of her hus band. The argument that the interest which she possessed at the time of making the gift was limited interest is entirely un tenable; firstly because Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act stood repealed by Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act with the result that the provision contained in sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act according to which the in terest acquired under S. 3 was to be limit ed interest no longer held the field when the Hindu Succession Act was enacted; and secondly because in view of the clear language of S. 14 of the Act itself there is no scope for the argument that Smt. Gomti Devi had anything short of full and absolute ownership in the property, the wordings of Sec. 14 being "shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner." The explanation to Sec tion 14 (1) further makes it clear that the right of full ownership shall be conferred on the female hi respect of property acquired by her "in any other manner whatsoever". The wordings "in any other manner whatsoever" are of such wide amplitude that they necessarily cover pro perty acquired under Section 3 (2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act.