SMT. JAMILA KHATOON AND OTHERS Vs. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION, UP LUCKNOW CAMP AT MORADABAD AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the finding of the Dy. Director of Consolidation that the partition deed dated 8 -7 -1964, was not proved, and, hence was inadmissible in evidence, was legally incorrect. In support reliance has been placed upon Single Judge decision in Khayali Ram v/s. Joint Director of Consolidation ( : 1968 AWR 306). In that case, it was submitted that by reason of S. 43, Indian Evidence Act, the judgment of a judicial officer in a previous litigation, was not admissible. This plea was repelled by the learned Judge, on the ground that it was a fresh point, and he was not inclined to permit it to be raised for the first time before him. The learned Judge then observed that "Such a contention............would lead to another question as to whether or not the Indian Evidence Apt would apply to consolidation proceedings. Without expressing any final opinion on this question, to me it appears that the consolidation authorities not being courts, the proceedings before them are not governed by the Indian Evidence Act; so that the consolidation authorities can rely upon material which pay not strictly be admissible according to the Indian Evidence Act. S. 1, Indian Evidence Act, provides that the Act applied to all judicial proceedings in or before any court, but not to affidavits presented to any court or officer, nor to proceedings before an arbitrator. S. 3 of the Evidence Act defines a 'court' to include all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence. It will thus be seen that all per sons legally authorised to take evidence are courts within meaning of the Evidence Act; and to judicial proceedings before them, the Evidence Act is applicable.

(2.) S. 38, UP Consolidation of Holdings Act, provides: - -

(3.) S. 40 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act provides that a proceeding before the Director of Consolidation, Dy. Director of Consolidation, Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Consolidation Officer and Assistant Consolidation Officer shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding. Apart from this express provision, there can be no doubt that the adjudication of an objection u/S. 9A by the Asstt. Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Officer, and the adjudication of the appeal and the revision by the Settlement Officer and the Dy. Director of Consolidation are judicial proceedings. These authorities are thus 'courts' within meaning of the Evidence Act; the provisions of that Act are applicable to the judicial proceedings before them. In our opinion, the tentative view expressed in Khayali Ram's case is not sustainable.