YUDHISTHIR SINGH Vs. BATAUNA DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from a decree passed by a District Judge dismissing on appeal the appellant's petition under Sec. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce from his wife. He himself valued the relief at Rs. 200 and filed the petition in the court of a Civil Judge. The Civil Judge allowed the petition, but on appeal the learned District Judge dismissed it. He comes up in second appeal to this Court on the only ground that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. This appeal came up for hearing before out brother Bishambhar Dayal, who has referred it to a larger Bench because he thought that the question of jurisdiction raised is an important one.

(2.) The right of appeal from a decree passed in any proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act is governed by Sec. 28 of it which lays down that a decree or order made in such a proceeding may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force. It is not in dispute that the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act is the law which governs the right of appeal and the forum of appeal. Under Sec. 21 an appeal from a decree or order of a Civil Judge lies to the District Judge where the value of the original suit, in which it was made, did not exceed Rs. 10,000 and to the High Court in any other case. Since the appeal filed by the respondents was from a decree made by a Civil Judge in a petition which was valued at less than Rs. 10,000, the appeal lay in the Court of the District Judge.

(3.) The main argument of the appellant before us was that the subject-matter of the petition was not capable of valuation and that consequently the appeal lay in the High Court in accordance with the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Paras Ram Vs. Janki Bai, 1961 ALJ 232 as if no valuation had been put down on the plaint. In other words he contended that though he himself had valued the relief at Rs. 200 the petition should be deemed to have not been valued at all. We are unable to accept this argument that the petition should be deemed to have been not valued simply because the relief sought under it was not capable of valuation. There are several reliefs in respect of which suits can be filed but which are not capable of valuation, for instance a suit for injunction or a suit for accounts or a suit for dissolution of a partnership. The Legislature has provided for the fixation of valuation of all such suits, vide the provision in Sec. 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, which lays down that when the subject-matter of any suit, barring certain suits, is such that in the opinion of the High Court it does not admit of being satisfactorily valued, it will be valued in accordance with the rules to be made by the High Court. Thus, even when a suit is not capable of being valued it has to be valued. Under the C.P.C., Or. VII, R. 1, every plaint of a suit must contain a statement of the value of the subject-matter for the purposes of jurisdiction and of court-fees this provision applies in all suits regardless of whether they are capable of valuation or not. For the purposes of court-fees a plaintiff is given the freedom to value the relief claimed in certain suits at any amount of his choice. For example, he can value the relief sought in a suit for injunction or in a suit for accounts at any amount. Since the court-fee is payable ad valorem on these suits whatever valuation is fixed by the plaintiff is to be the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction under Sec. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. Thus, even in suits which are not capable of valuation there has to be a valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction and the law has provided for it. The contention of the appellant that the valuation fixed by him on the petition should be ignored and that the petition should be treated as one on which no valuation had been fixed, cannot, therefore, be accepted. If he had not fixed any valuation on the petition the appeal from the decree or order of the court would have lain in this Court as held in the case of Paras Ram, 1961 ALJ 232 , but when he himself fixed the valuation at Rs. 200 he cannot plead that the petition was riot capable of valuation or that the valuation be ignored.