(1.) ON 29th November, 1961 this Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction took proceedings against Sri Sunderlal Srivastava, a clerk of an Advocate of this Court, for contempt of Court on the ground that on that date, while the Court was sitting and hearing a case, he was making noise in the corridor and disturbing the Court and defied the authority of the police official who, on the Court's orders, asked him to observe silence. After the Reader of the Court had failed to restore silence in the corridor, the Court sent a constable on duty to take action. He reported to the Court that three persons were talking loudly in the corridor, one of whom was the respondent Sunderlal Srivastava who on being requested by the constable to move and not disturb the Court, asked him to show by what authority he was acting. Thereupon the respondent was brought before this Court under its orders and questioned, but he denied that he had talked noisily or challenged the authority of the constable. The constable Samar Bahadur Singh was examined on oath and his statement recorded. The defendant's counsel (who is also the Advocate employing him) took an adjournment to enable him to cross -examine the constable and prepare the defence. On the 1st December, counsel wanted another adjournment on the ground that he had not been able to verify the facts or prepare the defence. He was asked by the Court to state whether he had been instructed to plead guilty or not guilty, and obtained a short adjournment to answer this question. Later in the day Mr. S.B.L. Gaur, a senior Advocate of this Court appeared for the defendant and stated that the defendant was sorry for what he had done and tendered his apology. The defendant who was present in Court repeated the apology. The Court reserved its orders.
(2.) THIS Court has an inherent power to punish any person who by his conduct disturbs its proceedings or otherwise interferes with the administration of justice. It is not necessary to trace the historical roots of the jurisdiction of this Court to punish for contempt of itself which is now derived from Article 215 of the Constitution. The extent of this power is co -extensive with that of the Court of the Queen's Bench in England. Under the English Common law the Court of the King's Bench derived its jurisdiction from the Sovereign and contempt of the King's Court was punishable as contempt of the Sovereign. But the nature of the contempt jurisdiction of the Indian High Courts today must necessarily be different, being derived from a republican Constitution under which political sovereignty resides in the people and legal sovereignty is distributed among the various organs of government. The Courts have advisedly refrained from defining too precisely or circumscribing this power, and any conduct which tends to interfere with the administration of justice is punishable as contempt of Court. But in a democratic republic the moral justification for the vast power of the High Court to punish in a summary manner any citizen for contempt must be justified on the ground of the public interest.
(3.) I think it can be so justified. The judiciary more than any other organ of the State depends for the successful discharge of its prestige. Unlike the executive it has no power to execute its commands, and unlike the legislature it has no mandate from the electorate. Unlike both it is not liable to any other authority to account for the wisdom of its decision; and yet its decisions are invariably obeyed by the ex -ecutive and respected by the legislature. The source of its authority can be stated in a single word, prestige. The prestige of the High Courts in India is not derived from any mystical or tribal cult or from the majesty of any sovereign as in England. It rests on concrete pillars - namely the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the Judges and upon the traditional atmosphere of dignified calm surrounding the law Courts. Even a losing litigant should leave the Court with a feeling that his case was decided by an impartial judge, that he had a fair hearing, and that the Court devoted its full attention to his grievance. It follows that any one who disturbs the Court or creates around it an atmosphere resembling that of the market place interferes with the administration of justice. He creates an impression that the Court is unable to maintain a proper atmosphere for its efficient functioning, and thereby lowers the prestige of the Court and shakes the confidence of the public in the judicial process. Such conduct amounts to contempt of Court, and it is in, the public interest that the disturber should be punished to restore the confidence of the citizens in the judicial process.